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Abstract 
 
The issues of social desirability and faking are for many psychologists associated with control 
instruments to avoid response distortion. For a long time, research questions tended to 
examine the consequences of faking. There are only a few studies which explored the nature 
of social desirability or faking, and that is where the current dissertation makes a contribution. 
In most studies of social desirability or faking, the investigation of response distortion in two 
different situations is described. On the one hand, unintentional distortion is often explored in 
research. On the other hand, intentional distortion is examined in the practical field. The first 
study was an online survey in which the sample completed a large number of questionnaires 
regarding social desirability, overclaiming, overconfidence, and personality to investigate the 
common core of a shared nomological network. The results suggest there is no common core 
among response distortion forms. Overclaiming seems to have its own nomological network. 
Overconfidence is regarded more as a metacognitive ability rather than a response distortion 
form. In the second study, by dint of a modeling technique (Ziegler, Maaß, Griffith, & 
Gammon, 2015), a latent faking variable could be modeled. Subsequently, the relationship 
between the faking variable and social desirability, overclaiming, and the dark triad was 
examined. The data of an experimental group and a control group were collected with two 
measurement occasions. The experimental group was first asked in an online survey to fill out 
questionnaires. Later the participants came to the laboratory and were randomly assigned to a 
special instruction group. The results show that Machiavellianism and one factor of socially 
desirable responding have significant regression weights for both faking conditions. 
Furthermore, Study 2 implies different psychological processes of faking good and faking 
bad.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Themen soziale Erwünschtheit und Faking sind für Psychologen verbunden mit 
Kontrollinstrumenten, die eingesetzt werden müssen, um Antwortverzerrungen zu vermeiden. 
Lange Zeit wurde erforscht, ob sozial erwünschtes Verhalten beziehungsweise Faking 
Konsequenzen hat. Es gibt einzelne Studien, die die Eigenschaft der Konstrukte untersuchen 
und daran knüpft die vorliegende Arbeit an. Es existieren in den Studien zur sozialen 
Erwünschtheit und Faking zwei typische Situationen. In Forschungsstudien werden eher 
unbewusste Prozesse der Antwortverzerrungen untersucht. Studien aus der Praxis 
beschäftigen sich vor allem mit bewusster Verfälschung.  
Die erste Studie wurde online durchgeführt, in der Probanden eine Vielzahl von Fragebögen 
zu den Themen soziale Erwünschtheit, Overclaiming, Overconfidence und Persönlichkeit 
ausfüllten, um den gemeinsamen Kern eines nomologischen Netzwerkes zu untersuchen. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigten, dass kein gemeinsamer Kern der Fragebögen gefunden werden konnte. 
Overclaiming scheint ein eigenes nomologisches Netzwerk zu bilden. Overconfidence kann 
eher als Fähigkeit der Metakognition als eine Antwortverzerrung bezeichnet. In der zweiten 
Studie wurde mit einem Model (Ziegler et al., 2015) eine latente Fakingvariable modelliert 
und anschließend der Zusammenhang zu Skalen der sozialen Erwünschtheit, Overclaiming und 
den Dark Triad untersucht. Dabei wurden Daten einer Experimentalstichprobe und einer 
Kontrollgruppe zu zwei Messzeitpunkten erhoben. Die Experimentalstichprobe füllte online zum 
ersten Messzeitpunkt mehrere Skalen aus. Zum zweiten Messzeitpunkt beantworteten die 
Probanden im Labor den Persönlichkeitsfragebogen erneut, unter einer zufällig zugeordneten 
Fakinginstruktion. Die Analyse der Daten ergab bedeutsame Zusammenhänge zwischen der 
latenten Fakingvariablen und Machiavellismus und einem Faktor zur sozialen Erwünschtheit. 
Außerdem wurde deutlich, dass der psychologische Prozess für die zwei Faking Situationen 
unterschiedlich ist.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
- A lie is a vice only when it does harm. It is a very great virtue when it does good. - 
(Voltaire) 
 
 
Maybe because of the “virtue” introduced by Voltaire, lying or response distortion are 
interesting and cross-epochal issues. No matter if lying is investigated scientifically or 
socially - we, humans, are interested often times in the same questions: Can we prevent lying? 
And if not: How could we detect response distortion? Who is the best liar?  
Psychologists have investigated the topic of response distortion scientifically since the 
middle of the 20th century. Above all, the term SOCIAL DESIRABILITY represents a key 
form of response distortion. The aim of psychological assessment is the accurate description 
of behavioral and cognitive attributes. It seems to be too time-consuming to drop a test person 
in a special social situation and observe how he or she reacts or feels; instead we ask directly 
“Are you an enthusiastic person?” In that process we are dependent on self-reports where the 
accuracy is vulnerable. This occurs because of response distortion. This use of noncognitive 
attributes occurs in nearly every life. In assessment centers for a personnel selection, in 
clinical treatments or for educational decisions- a self-report measurement is indispensable. 
Personality measures in the form of self-reports have a lot of benefits: They are simple, 
applicable for big samples, and more accepted than cognitive tasks like intelligence measures. 
In the field of organizational psychology personality inventories demonstrated good 
prediction for personnel selection (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Nonetheless, self-reports are easy 
to fake.  
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By searching the term “social desirability” in Google scholar you receive more than 
400.000 results. Apparently, the questions “Why is another study about social desirability 
necessary? What is new?” are suspended in mid-air when reading the topic of the current 
dissertation. While researchers in the area of social desirability mostly concentrate on what 
outcome or role socially desirable responding has, some questions have not been satisfactorily 
answered so far. Among them, for example: What is the common core of social desirability 
and its synonyms? Which role do situational aspects play in the way of response distortion?  
The following passages of this dissertation contain background information regarding 
social desirability in general and faking in more detail. First, I describe the state of the art of 
research focusing on social desirability. In accordance with that research I examine the 
nomological network of social desirability and faking by means of two standard situations in 
two studies: In low-stakes settings (Study 1) and in high-stakes settings (Study 2). Lastly, I 
summarize the present results, and discuss implications for future directions. 
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2.  SOCIAL DESIRABILITY 
2.1 What we Know About Social Desirability 
According to Paulhus socially desirable responding (SDR) is “defined as the tendency 
to give positive self-descriptions” (Paulhus, 2002, p. 49). That is why a responder could 
obtain more desirable scores than would be attained by responding honestly.  
According to Jackson and Messick (1958) response distortion can be divided into two 
forms: response set and response style. Response sets represent inconsistent behavior across 
time and measurements (Ziegler, MacCann, & Roberts, 2012a). Response styles “[…] have a 
stable and valid component […]” (Jackson & Messick, 1958, p. 244). Acquiescence - agree to 
items regardless of the content of items -, or overgeneralization are familiar response styles in 
psychology. Also social desirability could be categorized as a response style (Jackson & 
Messick, 1958).   
In this section a short summary of the history of the construct social desirability is 
given and the two-tier model of Paulhus (2002) is presented.  
2.1.1 The History of Social Desirability 
There exist already some articles about the history of social desirability and the origin 
of deception (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006; Holden & Passey, 2009; Paulhus, 2002; Zickar & 
Gibby, 2006). Therefore, this part is only a summary of important points regarding social 
desirability without repeating already cited articles.  
Already a lot of philosophers have been engaged in thinking and writing about self-
deception. Sartre and Kierkegaard considered self-deception to be a moralistic issue: Either an 
individual is responsible for his or her behavior or deny that responsibility as a self-deceiver 
(Paulhus, 1986). The moralistic issue is an important aspect of social desirability and from 
this follows current taxonomies of the named construct.    
Interestingly, some articles engaged in the question of the human reasons for 
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deception or lying. According to Griffith and McDaniel (2006) the origin of deception is 
evolution, from is like a biological point of view. If somebody could deceive the predator he 
or she has a better chance to survive. However Griffith and McDaniel (2006) emphasized the 
intentional character of deception, and they also draw parallels to the employment setting 
where the competitive forces of nature operate, figuratively. A more psychoanalytical point of 
view came from Paulhus with his statement: “In the beginning there was Freud” (Paulhus, 
1986, p. 144). Paulhus argued that Freud’s concept of the unconscious lay the foundation for 
self-deception. Because of unconscious behavior people may lie to themselves. Motivation of 
aggressive behavior is one reason for lying to the self because of the conscious knowledge 
that aggression is not accepted in society.  
There exists a very suitable description of the research development regarding social 
desirability since the middle of the 20th century: “Like a forest fire, disagreements regarding 
the topic have ranged from the incendiary blazes of the 1960s to controlled flames in the 
1970s and 1980s. During the 1990s, some believed the fire had been extinguished, but the 
first decade of the 2000s has seen that the debate still smolders” (Holden & Passey, 2009, p. 
441). Around the 1960s a lot of psychologists appreciated the meaning of socially desirable 
responding and most of them were agreed about how to control for social desirability. In this 
period a lot of socially desirable responding measurements were developed, which are still 
used today partially in research and in the practical field. I will get back to measurements later 
when presenting the current empirical studies. In addition to the developing processes to 
control for social desirability, structural knowledge about the construct has also developed. A 
lot of researchers agreed that social desirability is a multidimensional construct (Messick, 
1960; N. Wiggins, 1966). J. S. Wiggins (1964) labeled two independent clusters of typical 
socially desirable responding scales with Alpha and Gamma. Damarin and Messick (1965) 
were the first researchers who investigated the psychological constructs underlying Alpha and 
Gamma. Their first factor named “Autistic Bias in Self-Regard” could be associated with self-
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esteem and their second factor “Propagandistic Bias” is related to social approval (Paulhus, 
2002). That was the first categorization of the construct social desirability and the theoretical 
and empirical background for Paulhus’ model which - in terms of the state of the art – is the 
current model of social desirability.  
2.1.2 Paulhus’ Model of Social Desirability  
When Zickar and Gibby (2006) investigated the relationship between faking and social 
desirability, they related conscious response distortion to faking and unconscious response 
distortion to social desirability. The two motives are still relevant for response distortion but 
in the model of social desirability of Paulhus (2002) they are integrated for the whole 
construct of social desirability. According to Paulhus’ conception there are conscious and 
unconscious forms of socially desirable responding. Figure 1 displays Paulhus’ (2002) 
socially desirable responding model.  
 
Figure 1. Paulhus’ (2002) social desirability model.  
It is a hierarchical model and social desirability is positioned at the top and the 
outcomes of the model are four types of socially desirable responding. The two-tiered model 
differentiates between the theme of the bias (egoistic vs. moralistic) and the type of audience 
(self vs. others). Egoistic bias is a “tendency to exaggerate one’s social and intellectual status” 
(Paulhus, 2002, p. 63) and moralistic bias is defined as a “tendency to deny socially-deviant 
impulses and claim sanctimonious, ‘saint-like’ attributes” (p. 64). Therefore, Paulhus 
followed the consensus in research regarding two empirical factors of social desirability. 
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Paulhus’ egoistic bias is associated with Wiggins (1964) Alpha factor and the moralistic bias 
is connected with Gamma. Paulhus investigated correlations between Alpha and the 
personality factors extraversion and openness. Gamma was correlated with conscientiousness 
and agreeableness. A process level of conscious and unconscious distortion is included in 
Alpha as well as in the Gamma factor. Based on the four different types of socially desirable 
responding, Paulhus (2002) demands four different types of questionnaires. But this 
differentiation for measures of socially desirable responding is not the common practice in 
research. In the part on research questions I will pick up this point again. 
Whereas Jackson and Messick (1958) characterized socially desirable responding as a 
response style, Paulhus differentiated the assignment of the construct social desirability in 
terms of the response forms. Paulhus (2002) showed empirically that impression management 
“[…] has so many sources and is so sensitive to situational demands” (p. 65). He concluded 
his study with the thesis that the two forms agency and communion management are rather 
response sets. Contrarily, Paulhus classified the self-deceptive response biases as a response 
style because of its stable component.  
The presented model of social desirability is the theoretical foundation of this 
dissertation and the definition involved the model of socially desirable responding was 
applied.  
2.2 Faking 
A summary of faking history can be found in Zickar and Gibby (2006). They indicate 
that in the early 1930s researchers thought about the intentional distortion of personality 
inventories and they emphasized that techniques were required. Also Ellingson, Sackett, and 
Connelly (2007) described faking as an intentional distortion. The latest review of faking 
comes from Ziegler, MacCann, and Roberts (2012b). “Faking represents a response set aimed 
at providing a portrayal of the self that helps a person to achieve personal goals. Faking 
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occurs when this response set is activated by situational demands and person characteristics to 
produce systematic differences in test scores that are not due to the attribute of interest” 
(Ziegler et al., 2012b, p. 8).   
A plethora of studies investigated contradictory outcomes of faking - “The breadth of 
findings varies from studies concluding that faking has a substantial effect on test scores’ 
construct validity (Ziegler & Buehner, 2009) to studies indicating that such response 
distortions affect the test scores’ criterion-related validity (Holden, 2007)” (Bensch, Maaß, 
Greiff, Horstmann, & Ziegler, accepted, p. 4). These different results are maybe a 
consequence of different definitions and operationalizations of faking. That is why the topic 
of the current dissertation is the investigation of the nomological network of faking using as 
its basic concept the faking definition by Ziegler et al. (2012).  
According to Paulhus’ model of social desirability faking is similar to agency and 
communion management because of its conscious and deliberate character. Despite this fact, 
faking is often operationalized with classical socially desirable responding questionnaires- 
included the unintentional facets of social desirability. Again, a lot of similarities of one 
response set - faking - are used in research and it is not clarified satisfactorily whether the 
simultaneous application is justified. 
The requested techniques (Zickar & Gibby, 2006) for modeling faking came in the 
noughties. A lot of theoretical models of faking were suggested (more information about the 
models can be found in Study 2; Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; 
McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Robie, Brown, & 
Beaty, 2007; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999; Ziegler, 2011). The current dissertation uses the 
statistical model of Ziegler et al. (2015) who “proposed a modeling approach that is based on 
latent difference score models (LDSM; McArdle, 2001) and factor mixture models (FMMs). 
LDSMs allow researchers to capture quantitative differences between faked and honest 
responses” (Bensch et al., accepted, p. 9). Another advantage of this model is that faking 
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behavior can be predicted by other psychological constructs and this fact is useful in 
exploring the nomological network of faking which is the focus of the current dissertation.   
One basic concept of the faking definition by Ziegler et al. (2012b) is the situational 
demands which affect faking behavior. In the research of faking two classical situations were 
focused on: faking bad and faking good. Faking bad or malingering could typically be 
observed in clinical settings, to influence a diagnosis decision. Faking good is often times a 
problem in personality selection processes, where applicants want to present themselves in the 
best way (Ziegler et al., 2012a).  
2.3 Other Response Distortion Forms 
 Since Paulhus’ book chapter about social desirability (2002), new questionnaires were 
developed and articles used terms of response distortion as synonyms. Two response 
distortion forms named overclaiming and overconfidence were explored because of their 
theoretical as well as methodological parallels.   
2.3.1 Overclaiming 
 Because of many doubts regarding the socially desirable responding measurements 
Paulhus and Harms (2004) developed a more objective measure named the overclaiming 
questionnaire. “Over-claiming is the tendency to claim knowledge about nonexistent items” 
(Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003, p. 891). A typical overclaiming test is a 
comprehensive self-report measure with items that reflect academic and everyday knowledge. 
Particularity, some items are non-existent items, they are preconceived. Respondents have to 
indicate in a questionnaire how familiar they are with the items. By dint of the signal 
detection theory (Paulhus et al., 2003), researchers could measure knowledge exaggeration 
and knowledge accuracy simultaneously. According to Paulhus et al. (2003) overclaiming 
could be classified as a synonym of self-enhancement, one type of social desirability 
(Paulhus, 2002).  
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2.3.2 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence means to overestimate one’s own ability. Primarily, the construct self-
confidence (Stankov & Crawford, 1997) describes a continuum from underconfidence to 
overconfidence. In combination with socially desirable responding only overconfidence is of 
note. In combination with a cognitive ability test, participants have to indicate how confident 
they are (by using a percentage scale) about the accuracy of their answer. “The percentage of 
correctly answered items in the test can then be substracted from the average of confidence 
ratings across all items in the test. […] Positive scores indicate that people are overconfident 
about their performance” (Bensch, Paulhus, Stankov, & Ziegler, 2017, p. 3).   
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3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
After introducing the key psychological constructs and response distortion forms, I 
would like to present the research questions of the current dissertation. 
According to Paulhus’ model (2002) of socially desirable responding, which 
distinguished between intentional and unintentional distortion, the following two studies will 
investigate social desirability systematically subdivided into unintentional and intentional 
distortion research. Since Paulhus’ book chapter (2002) no more thorough and systematic 
review of social desirability has been provided, which is why a reappraisal is obligatory. 
There exist two typical situations for using socially desirable responding tests: (1) in 
research, where the outcomes of unintentional distortion are oftentimes investigated and (2) in 
practice, where the major topic is intentional distortion or faking. Ziegler et al. (2012b) 
described the situational demand for response distortion with other concepts: “The strength or 
possibility of reward is often described as the stakes of the testing situation. A low-stakes test 
has no or few important consequences whereas a high-stakes test may result in consequences 
that are highly valued by the test takers” (p. 7). 
3.1 Research: Low-Stakes Setting    
 Within the scope of the first study - the first situation - the combination of a typical 
research design with unintentional response distortion and nearly no consequences for the 
participants was investigated in the current dissertation. Here, the question: 
(1) What is the nomological network of social desirability?, 
will be explored.  
 “Cronbach and Meehl (1955) put forward necessary steps for laying out a nomological 
network. Among other aspects, they emphasized that a nomological network needs to make 
clear how theoretical constructs relate to each other” (Bensch et al., 2017, p. 1). In addition to 
Paulhus (2002) we investigated the nomological network of social desirability including 
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overclaiming and overconfidence, and personality. Various studies indicate strong relations 
between measurements of personality and socially desirable responding (Ones, Viswesvaran, 
& Reiss, 1996; Pauls & Stemmler, 2003; Perinelli & Gremigni, 2016) and that is why it is 
important to also include personality factors in the nomological network of social desirability.  
3.2 Practice: High-Stakes Setting 
 The second study deals with the combination of intentional distortion and (severe) 
consequences for the test takers. This description of a situation could be reflected in the 
definition of Ziegler et al. (2012b), where the response set faking was described. That is why 
the question: 
(2) What is the nomological network of faking?, 
is investigated in study two.  
 There exist some studies that explore the process of faking (Robie et al., 2007; Ziegler, 
2011; Ziegler et al., 2015) but research on the differentiation between the two classical 
situations faking bad and faking good is scarce. Furthermore, the classification of faking in 
the model of Paulhus (2002) is inadequately clarified.  
 
 Focused on these two mentioned research questions, two empirical studies are 
presented in the following two passages. Afterwards, in the section of the general discussion, 
answers to the two questions are given in accordance with the results of the two studies.     
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4. TEASING APART OVERCLAIMING, OVERCONFIDENCE, 
AND SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING (STUDY 1) 
Between the positivity biases of socially desirable responding, overclaiming and 
overconfidence there are theoretical as well as methodological parallels. Actually, some 
studies use the terms as synonyms (e.g., Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). Positive 
distortion is the shared feature between these three response biases, which implies that scores 
from all of these measures could be related within a nomological network (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). Previous research focused only on dyadic relationships but research about a 
common core is scarce. That is why Study 1 of this dissertation explores whether standard 
positivity bias measurements share a common nomological network in a low-stakes setting. 
Integrated in the same nomological network of positivity bias are closely related constructs 
such as intelligence and personality.  
4.1 Socially Desirable Responding for a Low-Stakes Setting 
In an online survey 789 participants had to fill out an inventory consisting of 
measurements of social desirability, overclaiming, crystallized intelligence, Big Five and 
grandiose narcissism. With regard to the definitions of social desirability, overclaiming and 
overconfidence there could be an overlap between all three positivity biases because there are 
some similarities in terms of a distorted self-portrayal: As aforementioned socially desirable 
responding is related to a more positive self-description; overclaiming is associated with 
wanting to appear more knowledgeable; and overconfidence is characterized by an 
overestimation of one’s performance. Furthermore, there exists an operational overlap 
between overclaiming and overconfidence by using a performance test, and this captures 
ability exaggeration. Additionally, overclaiming is integrated in the Paulhus’ model of social 
desirability. That is why we expected a common core between all three positivity bias 
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measurements and by adding the closely related constructs to the nomological network we 
expected to clarify specific variance information.  
   
To summarize, Study 1 investigated the nomological network of socially desirable 
responding in a low stakes setting. 
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5. THE NATURE OF FAKING—A HOMOGENEOUS AND 
PREDICTABLE CONSTRUCT? (STUDY 2) 
As previously mentioned, faking is similar to Paulhus’ agency and communion 
management forms in the model of social desirability. The construct of faking, mainly for 
high stakes settings, has been explored in many research studies (for a recent review, see 
Ziegler et al., 2012b). In comparing the results of these studies, again a plethora of different 
operationalizations of faking was conspicuous, which impedes the investigation of faking 
behavior. Again, a reappraisal of the nomological network of faking is necessary to 
understand the common core and closely related constructs of faking.  
5.1 Faking in a High-Stakes Setting 
In total, 400 persons participated in Study 2 with two measurement occasions - 
divided into an experimental group (N = 233) and a control group (N = 167). The data of the 
control group were collected by Ziegler and Buehner (2009). The control group filled out a 
personality measure twice with a two hours time interval between both measurement points. 
The experimental group was first asked to fill out questionnaires of social desirability, 
overclaiming, and personality with regular instructions in an online survey. Later (after an 
average of one week), they were randomly assigned to a special instruction group (faking bad 
or faking good) and came to a laboratory. By dint of a modeling technique introduced by 
Ziegler et al. (2015) faking could be measured as a latent variable and interindividual 
differences in faking behavior could be investigated. Study 2 had three research objectives: 
(1) Replicate the modeling technique by Ziegler et al. (2005) and extend it to the faking bad 
instruction and to all the Big Five, because the model has so far been applied only for 
conscientiousness. (2) Some studies examined the process of faking (Robie et al., 2007; 
Ziegler, 2011; Ziegler et al., 2015) but we want to go deeper and investigate the process of 
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faking good and faking bad. (3) Little is known about the personality of individuals who 
faked scores. That is why the predictive power of several constructs, for example socially 
desirable responding, is also tested.  
 
The next section describes in more detail the procedure of Study 2, where faking was 
investigated in a high stakes situation.  
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6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The title of the current dissertation indicates its research objective: A Reappraisal 
regarding the nomological network of social desirability and faking is necessary because of 
new developments in questionnaires and new modeling techniques which enabled a more 
precisely differentiation between different constructs or questionnaires.        
6.1 Summary of the Findings 
 In the following, I summarize the results of Studies 1 and 2 with a special focus on the 
common core of, respectively, social desirability and faking.  
6.1.1 What is the nomological network of social desirability? 
Study 1 indicated, that there is no common core between the three positivity bias 
measurements socially desirable responding, overclaiming, and overconfidence. Each 
measurement captures specific variance more than shared variance. In terms of construct 
validity there is (1) no evidence for convergent validity between the three positivity biases 
because the correlations between socially desirable questionnaires and, respectively, 
overclaiming and overconfidence are low. (2) Regarding the discriminant validity we found 
good evidence as a result of only moderate correlations between the scores of personality 
factors and scores of overconfidence and overclaiming. But (3) the high correlations between 
the scores of socially desirable responding and scores of personality questionnaires are 
problematic. There is no discriminant validity evidence. This is in line with previous findings 
that socially desirable responding and personality are difficult to differentiate. This debate 
about substance versus style has been discussed (Jackson & Messick, 1958; McCrae & Costa, 
1983) several times.  
Additionally, the exploratory analyses in Study 1 support findings about the problem 
with the large overlap between socially desirable responding and personality. Only the factor 
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named egoistic bias was free of a substantial overlap with personality. We could also 
conclude that overclaiming and overconfidence seem to have their own nomological network 
because they could not be explained by any of the factors. The measurements of overclaiming 
and overconfidence determine unique variance. The exploratory analyses from Study 1 
revealed the same factor for crystallized intelligence and overconfidence, which is why we 
propose that overconfidence is a metacognitive ability rather than a positivity bias. Because of 
these findings, overconfidence should not be integrated in further studies when exploring 
social desirability.  
All in all, the three response distortion forms do not share a common core and that is 
why an interchangeable use of socially desirable responding scales, overclaiming 
questionnaires or overconfidence measures is not proposed. The big overlaps between social 
desirability and personality are problematic and we still do not really know what socially 
desirable responding is - a response style or rather a personality facet? I will further discuss 
this point.  
6.1.2 What is the nomological network of faking? 
The results from Study 2 showed that the findings by Ziegler et al. (2015) could be 
replicated - variance in faking behavior could be modeled - and also expanded to include all 
Big Five (neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness), and that the faking bad instruction was successful. The study contributes 
to the faking literature in finding that faking behavior is not homogeneous across the five 
personality domains and the relevance of an item regarding the faking aim is important and 
secondary, it depends on the situational demands (faking good and faking bad). For this 
reason, as mentioned above, different results in other faking studies can be explained. The 
findings of Study 2 show that participants were able to understand the situation-specific 
demands and need knowledge about the relevance of each item for the instruction goal. This 
idea is further discussed in the next section. In a final step, faking behavior was predicted with 
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other scores of measurements. Only the Alpha factor - a common variance underlying the 
socially desirable responding scales of Edward and the self-deceptive enhancement scale - 
had a significant regression weight for both faking conditions. Faking good was influenced by 
Machiavellian tendencies.   
The findings point to the idea that faking is not a unidimensional process and it 
depends on the situational context and even the questions asked.  
6.2 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 The current work and its title imply a context linking social desirability and faking. 
Also the theoretical part of this dissertation, with the description of Paulhus’ model (2002) of 
social desirability, hypothesized that faking could be embedded into the model. The current 
results, however, imply a differentiation between social desirability and faking.  
Replication of Paulhus’ social desirability model. The first study did not support the social 
desirability model of Paulhus (2002). The difference between Paulhus’ and our study was the 
methodology. Paulhus correlates the scores of socially desirable responding with the scores of 
personality. We integrated the scores of personality into our nomological network of social 
desirability by analyzing an exploratory analysis with scores of socially desirable responding 
and personality additional to the correlations. Our results revealed four factors marked by 
socially desirable scales but three of them where also described by scores of personality. The 
substance versus style debate about the construct of social desirability is not yet examined 
adequately. In the study of de Vries, Zettler, and Hilbig (2014) the impression management 
scale was most predicted by the honesty-humility factor of the HEXACO (Ashton et al., 
2004) model of personality. The facets of the domain honesty-humility are sincerity, fairness, 
greed avoidance, and modesty (Ashton, Lee, & De Vries, 2014), which sound similar to the 
description of social desirability. Another interesting article by R. Hogan, Chamorro‐
Premuzic, and Kaiser (2013) established a relationship between socially desirable responding 
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and employability - the ability to get a job. Further research is necessary to explore what 
social desirability really is - a response style or rather a personality trait. Furthermore, Pauls 
and Crost (2004) suggested not classifying socially desirable responding into conscious and 
unconscious forms, but rather examining the situational context when self-presentation was 
distorted. 
Socially desirable responding measures. de Vries et al. (2014) provide a good summary to 
argue against the use of socially desirable responding scales: “Especially the use of 
impression management scales as a diagnostic tool among practitioners or - among 
researchers - as a tool to check for biases in new scales or to correct for biases in the relations 
with criteria, are practices that need to be corrected sooner rather than later” (p. 293). Based 
on our results we can only recommend the impression management scale and the self-
deceptive enhancement scale for low-stakes settings. In our high-stakes setting, the variance 
of the Alpha factor, marked by the Edwards scale and the self-deceptive enhancement scale, 
was a good predictor for faking. With regard to the other socially desirable responding scales 
the relationship to personality is too closed. Here, again, further studies are necessary to 
provide supporting evidence for the current results.  
 Without exception, Study 1 suggested no interchangeable use of the three positivity 
bias scales overclaiming, overconfidence and socially desirable responding because there was 
no evidence for a shared variance. With regard to overconfidence, as already mentioned, we 
expect that overconfidence is a metacognitive ability rather than a response distortion. For 
overclaiming, the finding of Paulhus (2002) that overclaiming is similar to self-enhancement 
could not be verified. Some existing studies examine the role of overclaiming (Bing, 
Kluemper, Davison, Taylor, & Novicevic, 2011; Feeney & Goffin, 2015; Kemper & Menold, 
2014) but as yet the breadth of findings varies (see study 1) about the interpretation of 
overclaiming as a positive bias, which is why more research is required.  
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Different faking processes. Certainly, we can advise the use of the model by Ziegler et al. 
(2015) to explore the nature of faking in different situations. It was especially interesting to 
see that the process of faking is not homogeneous, and these findings entail advice not to 
generalize results of studies with only one kind of faking condition (faking bad or faking 
good). Different social demands might be responsible for different psychological processes.  
Variance in faking behavior. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support use of the so-
called faking detection scales of socially desirable responding or overclaiming. Only the 
Alpha factor could explain variance in faking behavior in Study 2, but we now know from the 
first study that there is a big overlap between socially desirable responding and personality. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Pauls and Crost (2004) who claimed: “[…] in 
faking conditions social desirability scales do not seem to provide additional diagnostic 
information beyond that derived from personality scales.“ (p. 1149).  
 According to the definition by Ziegler et al. (2012b) faking is activated by situational 
demands, and this fact was controlled in Study 2. For this reason, conclusions with regard to 
personal characteristics – a further point of the faking definition - are possible. Based on our 
results, the outlook for Machiavellianism and narcissism is promising. Furthermore, Ziegler 
(2011) described in his cognitive process model of applicant faking behavior that specific 
knowledge and implicit theories about for example the job is important for faking. Also 
Griffith and McDaniel (2006) wrote that an association between the theory of mind (Premack 
& Woodruff, 1978) and faking exists. “This theory suggests that to effectively deceive an 
individual, the deceiver must understand what the target knows and how that information can 
be altered in a way to achieve a goal and evade detection” (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006, p. 7).   
6.3 Outlook and Future Directions for Research 
In the last section of this dissertation I briefly describe in what ways this dissertation 
was limited and suggest ideas for future directions of research of social desirability and 
faking.  
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6.3.1 Antecedents of social desirability and faking 
Within the current work, one limitation in Study 1 was the use of aggregated scores for 
overconfidence, overclaiming, and crystallized intelligence. Maybe a subdivision between 
different knowledge areas would allow a detailed view of the constructs of faking and social 
desirability. As mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, there is a considerable amount 
of research about the consequences of socially desirable responding and faking. When 
investigating the nomological network of a construct, the antecedents are also important. Van 
Iddekinge, McFarland, and Raymark (2007) differentiate between dispositional (personality 
traits) and situational antecedents. In this part I want to focus on the dispositional antecedents 
and in the next part I will discuss situational antecedents. McFarland and Ryan (2000) 
investigated which personality characteristics are related to faking. They found that 
“individuals who were low in integrity, low in conscientiousness, and high in neuroticism 
faked to a greater extent” (McFarland & Ryan, 2000, p. 816). Also in Study 1 we found 
strong correlations between neuroticism and scales of socially desirable responding. Maybe 
neuroticism is bridging the gap between personality and social desirability but also research 
on other personality factors, or better on the facets of personality, seems promising. One 
question could be: How is the relationship between faking behavior and integrity? 
Additionally, there is more work needed to understand how motivation and emotions 
influence faking or socially desirable responding. Ekman (2009) noted that fear and guilt are 
relevant emotions with regard to faking. For example, fear of getting caught is, according to 
Ekman, one reason not to fake.  
According to the model of Paulhus, faking could be categorized by agentic traits, but 
conscious response distortions could also take place in a dating situation. Benz, Anderson, 
and Miller (2005) investigated whether men were deceived with regard to their commitment - 
a characteristically trait of Gamma.   
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Furthermore, cognitive ability is essential to identify the desirable items in a 
personality inventory. Also several further research questions regarding the cognitive load are 
imaginable. For example: What kind of role does the theory of mind play with regard to 
response distortion?  
6.3.2 It depends on the situation 
Within the current work, one limitation was that we could not vary real-life influences 
for example job desirability. We had one situation in Study 1 and another in Study 2. But a 
wider variety of settings is required for investigation in the context of social desirability and 
faking. For example, real applicant settings and more studies from the clinical context are 
important to get a better understanding of response distortion.  R. Tett et al. (2006) described 
differences in answering personality self-ratings between applicants and incumbents. That is 
why the investigation of the job situation, the job market, and/or the desirability of a job could 
be propositions for future research. Also Griffith and McDaniel (2006) emphasized that 
situational demands are responsible for deceptive behavior. To summarize, to understand 
faking in greater detail, more work is needed.   
6.3.4 Collect more data 
 Future studies should focus more on collecting large data sets. One limitation of the 
current work is the use of only quantitative analyses, without a qualitative approach. Through 
the use of interviews one can get more information about differences in faking behavior. Also 
with regard to emotions, physiological measurements could provide more valid results than 
self-reported measures.      
6.4 Conclusion 
 This dissertation suggests not using overclaiming, overconfidence and socially 
desirable responding as synonyms. They do not share a common core in terms of a 
nomological network. Additionally, with regard to faking, we have to distinguish between 
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different faking situations and can not generalize the results for the whole response set. The 
framework and findings may be useful for future studies, and especially for the practical field 
of psychology.   
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Response bias has been defined as a “systematic tendency to 
answer questionnaire items on some basis that interferes with 
accurate self-reports” (Paulhus, 2002, p. 49). Self-reports are 
often used in psychological research and that is why it is 
important to investigate response biases. One response bias is 
socially desirable responding (SDR); that is, the tendency to 
give overly positive self-descriptions (Holden & Passey, 
2010). Paulhus (2002) also distinguished between intentional 
and unintentional distortion as well as an egoistic (or agentic) 
and a moralistic (communal) theme. Whereas much psycho-
logical research is concerned about unintentional distortions, 
real-life assessments can be hampered by intentional distor-
tions or faking (Ziegler, MacCann, & Roberts, 2011). In 
order to capture variance due to such response sets, lie scales 
and other methods such as the overclaiming technique have 
been developed (Bing, Kluemper, Kristl Davison, Taylor, & 
Novicevic, 2011). Within research on cognitive biases, a 
method is used which captures overconfidence (e.g., Koriat, 
Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Moore & Healy, 2008). 
Similar to SDR, overconfidence reflects a positive deviation 
between estimated and actual performance (Stankov & 
Crawford, 1997). Thus, there is a theoretical parallel between 
the two construct areas. Finally, the overclaiming technique 
(Paulhus, 2011) was initially introduced as an alternative 
methodology for capturing SDR. Interestingly, the actual 
operationalization of overclaiming is very similar to the oper-
ationalization of overconfidence. In fact, some studies have 
utilized overclaiming to operationalize overconfidence (e.g., 
Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). Thus, there are 
theoretical as well as methodological parallels between mea-
sures of SDR, overconfidence, and overclaiming. In particu-
lar, they all purport to tap a positive distortion in self-reports. 
For simplicity, we will use the term positivity bias as a generic 
term for all of these measures.
This shared feature (positive distortion), implies that scores 
from all of these measures share a common core or are at least 
closely related within a nomological network (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). Cronbach and Meehl (1955) put forward nec-
essary steps for laying out a nomological network. Among 
other aspects, they emphasized that a nomological network 
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Abstract
Contamination with positivity bias is a potential problem in virtually all areas of psychological assessment. To determine the 
impact of positivity bias, one common approach is to embed special indicators within one’s assessment battery. Such tools 
range from social desirability scales to overconfidence measures to the so-called overclaiming technique. Despite the large 
literature on these different approaches and underlying theoretical notions, little is known about the overall nomological 
network—in particular, the degree to which these constructs overlap. To this end, a broad spectrum of positivity bias 
detection tools was administered in low-stakes settings (N = 798) along with measures of the Big Five, grandiose narcissism, 
and cognitive ability. Exploratory factor analyses revealed six first-order and two second-order factors. Overclaiming was 
not loaded by any of the six first-order factors and overconfidence was not explained by either of the two second-order 
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needs to make clear how theoretical constructs relate to each 
other. Moreover, they stated “We can say that ‘operations’ 
which are qualitatively very different ‘overlap’ or ‘measure 
the same thing’ if their positions in the nomological net tie 
them to the same construct variable” (p. 290-291). Thus, the 
current research tries to determine whether SDR, overclaim-
ing, and overconfidence share a common core that ties 
together the seemingly different operations. In Figure 1, the 
nomological network of positivity bias with three measure-
ments named SDR, overclaiming and overconfidence is illus-
trated (Ziegler & Bäckström, 2016). Unfortunately, actual 
research testing this hypothesis of a common core is scarce. 
To close this gap, the present study was conducted to explore 
whether standard positivity bias measures share a common 
nomological network in low-stakes settings. Of course, our 
reliance on data captured in a low-stake setting cannot auto-
matically be generalized to high-stakes settings. This limita-
tion also means that we are more likely to pick up conscious 
rather than conscious distortion. Nonetheless, most psycho-
logical research utilizes low-stakes data, making this study an 
important first step in charting the map of positivity bias 
measures.
Socially Desirable Responding
A summary of the history of the construct and its develop-
ment in research are beyond the scope of the present article 
(for a recent summary, see Paulhus, 2002). Response distor-
tion via SDR allows the responder to achieve more desir-
able scores than would be obtained by responding honestly. 
This means that answers to personality questionnaires 
potentially contain extraneous variance due to SDR. With 
regard to the nomological network of SDR as expressed by 
its factor structure, most researchers agree on a two-factor 
solution (Wiggins, 1964). A more complex model from 
Paulhus (2002) is shown in Figure 2. SDR is positioned at 
the top of the hierarchy. Below, the two-tier model differen-
tiates between the theme of the bias (egoistic vs. moralistic) 
and type of audience (self or others). Egoistic bias is defined 
as a “tendency to exaggerate one’s social and intellectual 
status” (Paulhus, 2002, p. 63), and moralistic bias as a “ten-
dency to deny socially-deviant impulses and claim sancti-
monious, ‘saint-like’ attributes” (p. 64). The outcomes of 
this combination are four types of SDR. Paulhus (2002) 
replicated the two-factor structure reported by Wiggins 
(1964), who had named the factors Alpha and Gamma. 
Alpha is associated with egoistic bias, and Paulhus showed 
that it was correlated with openness, extraversion, and intel-
ligence. Gamma involves a moralistic bias and was corre-
lated with conscientiousness and agreeableness.
Different approaches have been suggested for measur-
ing the tendency to answer in a socially desirable way and 
thereby to capture the assumed bias. However, there is 
great diversity in the operationalizations of these 
approaches. On the one hand, there are stand-alone tests 
consisting of items describing socially desirable behaviors 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1957). On the other 
hand, SDR scales are also embedded within commercial 
personality inventories such as the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory’s Lie scale (Hathaway & McKinley, 
1951). The form of such approaches is usually a self-report 
questionnaire.
Despite the outlined theoretical foundations, the actual 
items used to measure SDR are often criticized. The major 
concern is that it is difficult to differentiate between vari-
ance due to substantial personality differences and SDR 
within typical SDR measures. For example, there are peo-
ple who truly possess socially desirable characteristics. 
Furthermore, various studies (Converse, Peterson, & 
Griffith, 2009; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996; Pauls & 
Stemmler, 2003) have revealed strong relations between 
Figure 1. The nomological network of positivity bias including 
SDR, overclaiming, and overconfidence depicted as a Venn 
diagram (Ziegler, Maaß, Griffith, & Gammon, 2015).
Note. SDR = socially desirable responding.
Figure 2. Paulhus’s (2002) socially desirable responding (SDR) 
model.
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personality measures and SDR measures. Disentangling the 
different sources of variance within the measures is difficult 
and requires sophisticated statistical methods and elaborate 
research designs (Ziegler & Bühner, 2009). Most research-
ers agree that it seems impossible to construct an SDR scale 
that does not capture substantial amounts of variance that 
are due to real individual differences in personality (Holden 
& Passey, 2010). Thus, in order to explore the joint nomo-
logical network of SDR measures, researchers need to 
include personality measures in their research in order to 
disentangle SDR and substantial personality variance.
Overclaiming
As a response to the problems associated with traditional 
SDR scales, a different approach to capture SDR was devel-
oped, namely, the overclaiming technique. “Over-claiming is 
the tendency to claim knowledge about nonexistent items” 
(Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003, p. 891). In a typical 
overclaiming test, respondents rate their familiarity with 
items that reflect content from science, engineering, music, 
and so on. A unique aspect of this method is the use of non-
existent items (at most 20%) called foils. The tendency to 
claim such items provides a concrete index of overclaiming. 
Application of this technique permits researchers to measure 
both knowledge exaggeration (Bias = [Hits + False alarms]/2) 
and knowledge accuracy (Accuracy = Hits − False alarms; 
Paulhus & Dubois, 2014). This is a significant advantage 
over other instruments that test for response biases only. On 
the one hand, the overclaiming questionnaire is a self-report 
method. On the other hand, it is an objective measure whose 
accuracy index can act as a proxy for intelligence, especially 
crystallized intelligence (Ziegler, Kemper, & Rammstedt, 
2013). If people show a tendency to claim knowledge of 
items that are predominantly foils, their bias score will be 
high, but if they mostly claim familiarity with real items, they 
will receive a high-accuracy score. With regard to the SDR 
model in Figure 2, overclaiming was empirically related to 
self-deceptive enhancement (SDE; Paulhus et al., 2003).
The overclaiming has been used to operationalize impres-
sion management (IM) and thus the deception of others (Bing 
et al., 2011). Yet this claim has not remained without critique 
(Feeney & Goffin, 2015; Kam, Risavy, & Perunovic, 2015; 
Ludeke & Makransky, 2015). Finally, other empirical evi-
dence suggests a stronger relationship of overclaiming with 
an egoistic bias and not a moralistic bias (Tonković, Galić, & 
Jerneić, 2011). Thus, despite mixed empirical evidence, there 
are strong theoretical reasons to locate overclaiming within 
the same nomological network as other SDR measures.
Overconfidence
For ability tests, there is a method that measures the overes-
timation of one’s own capabilities, namely, overconfidence. 
By this definition, it sounds like another potential candidate 
for the nomological network in focus here. Stankov and 
Crawford (1997) postulated the existence of a separate self-
confidence trait that, combined with accuracy, defines a 
continuum from overconfidence to underconfidence. Of 
interest to us, here is the method used to assess overconfi-
dence because it resembles other methods used to capture 
positivity bias. After completing an item from an ability 
test, participants are asked to indicate, using a percentage 
scale, how confident they are about the correctness of their 
answer. Again, two pieces of information are captured with 
each item: the correctness of the answer and the confidence 
rating. The percentage of correctly answered items in the 
test can then be subtracted from the average of confidence 
ratings across all items in the test. The result can be used as 
an estimate of a person’s calibration. Positive scores indi-
cate that people are overconfident about their performance. 
Besides the similarity to overclaiming in terms of opera-
tionalization, there are studies that have used overclaiming 
to capture overconfidence (Anderson et al., 2012). Using 
six studies, Anderson and colleagues wanted to investigate 
whether overconfident behavior serves to enhance one’s 
status in groups. In their second study, overconfidence was 
operationalized with an overclaiming questionnaire. 
Apparently, those authors view overclaiming tests as an 
alternative operationalization of overconfidence. Again, 
this opens up the possibility that overconfidence is part of 
the nomological network of positivity bias. It has to be 
stressed here that the authors of the method (Koriat et al., 
1980; Moore & Healy, 2008) never formulated such a claim.
Relations Between Socially Desirable 
Responding, Overclaiming, and 
Overconfidence
When considering the definitions of the three constructs 
described above, that is SDR, overclaiming, and overconfi-
dence, a number of similarities become apparent. SDR was 
defined as an overly positive self-portrayal. Similarly, over-
claiming also results in a distorted (i.e., more knowledgeable) 
self-portrayal. Also similar is the overestimation of one’s per-
formance indexed by overconfidence measures. Both over-
claiming and overconfidence are similar to SDR but restricted 
to a specific ability domain. Overclaiming is also directly 
linked to self-enhancement, which is part of the SDR model 
suggested by Paulhus (2002). Overclaiming and overconfi-
dence also share a further feature. Both are measured by 
using a performance test, and both measures capture ability 
exaggeration. In short, based on theoretical grounds as well 
as methodological similarities, it is reasonable to assume that 
overclaiming, and overconfidence are part of the same nomo-
logical network. In particular, if all measures capture positiv-
ity bias as defined earlier, they should have a common core 
within a shared nomological network.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistic of all Measures.
Scale Min Max M SD  ΩW
Extraversion (P) 5 20 (20) 13.79 3.50 0.86
Agreeableness (P) 5 20 (20) 12.17 3.03 0.75
Conscientiousness (P) 6 20 (20) 14.20 2.85 0.72
Neuroticism (P) 4 20 (20) 12.63 3.40 0.76
Openness (P) 8 25 (25) 20.63 3.28 0.88
Grandiose narcissism (P) 52 70 (80) 61.06 3.02 0.85
Edwards SDR scale (SDR) 25 97 (120) 59.55 12.88 0.88
First-factor Marlowe–Crowne scale (SDR; attribution of desirable behavior) 20 50 (50) 36.29 4.42 0.65
Second-factor Marlowe–Crowne scale (SDR; denial of undesirable behavior) 23 54 (65) 39.02 5.24 0.71
Self-deceptive enhancement (SDR) 51 120 (140) 83.98 9.11 0.73
Impression management (SDR) 46 120 (140) 78.80 9.36 0.78
Lie scale (SDR) 29 73 (75) 53.37 7.12 0.74
Confidence bias (OCO) −72 41.33 −1.48 12.69  
Crystallized intelligence (I) 20 96.67 (100) 69.19 12.48  
Overclaiming (OCL) 0.76 4 2.32 0.64  
Note. ΩW = McDonald’s Omega. In parenthesis (Max) = maximal possible range for every measure. In parenthesis (Scale): P = Personality; 
SDR = socially desirable responding; OCO = Overconfidence; I = Intelligence; OCL = Overclaiming. Openness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Neuroticism were measured with the Big Five Inventory (BFI-K).
Aims of the Present Study and 
Hypothesis
The last comprehensive exploration of the nomological net 
of social desirability (SDR) measures was conducted by 
Paulhus (2002) and resulted in the two-tiered model 
described above. Since then, the overclaiming technique 
has been developed as a novel measure of positivity bias. 
Finally, an operationally similar construct, namely, over-
confidence has served a similar role, primarily in cognitive 
psychology. As described above, all three constructs (SDR, 
overclaiming, and overconfidence) appear to share one fea-
ture—a positive departure from reality. We will use the term 
positivity bias to refer this shared feature.
The aim of the current study is to empirically test whether 
the conceptual and operational overlap can be recovered 
when analyzing the shared correlation matrix. The preceding 
overview of theoretical foundations and operationalizations 
suggests that all three constructs tap a response distortion 
related to a positivity bias. We could find no studies that pro-
viding empirical verification of whether SDR, overclaiming, 
and overconfidence are really part of one nomological net-
work sharing a common core. Such a finding would not pre-
clude specific variance, that is, additional variance unique to 
each measure. In this way, the three measures could represent 
facets of positivity bias. As Ziegler and Bäckström (2016) put 
it when discussing traits and facets: “[ . . . ] the trait score 
reflects a common core and facet scores a proportion of this 
core plus some specific variance” (p. 108).
In sum, we hypothesize a common core between measures 
of social desirability, overclaiming, and overconfidence—all 
reflecting a positivity bias. Furthermore, we assume that each 
measure also captures specific variance. Clear demonstration 
of a common core would support the interchangeable use of 
positivity bias measures. In addition, inclusion of closely 
related constructs such as intelligence, the Big Five and gran-
diose narcissism, should help clarify the unique information 
tapped by each of the three positivity bias measures.
Method
Sample and Procedure
Students of different fields of study from a large German uni-
versity took part in an online survey. Originally, the sample 
consisted of N = 1.617 students. We excluded participants who 
stopped at the first or second page and those who had a very 
short response time. In the end, a data set of N = 798 (female 
N = 572) were analyzed. Average age was 24.9 (SD = 5.16).
Measures
A total of nine measures were employed. Structured in cat-
egories of SDR, overclaiming, overconfidence, crystallized 
intelligence, and personality, each test is described in detail 
below. Descriptive statistics and reliability estimates are 
provided in Table 1.
Socially Desirable Responding. We used four SDR instru-
ments that are often applied in research and practice to cap-
ture SDR. To assess SDE and IM, we used a German version 
of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 
“Ein Inventar zur Erfassung von zwei Faktoren sozialer 
Erwünschtheit” [An Inventory Assessing Two Factors of 
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Socially Desirable Responding] (Musch, Brockhaus, & 
Bröder, 2002). Each scale consists of 10 items. Respondents 
rate the extent to which items are relatively consistent with 
their typical behaviors or attitudes. Items were rated on a 
7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not true to 7 = absolutely 
true). The total scores for each scale were used as represen-
tations of SDE and IM. One example for the SDE scale is “I 
am really certain of my judgments” and for the IM scale, “I 
never swear.”
The second measure of SDR was the Lie scale (15 items) 
from the German version of the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory–2 (MMPI-2; Hathaway, McKinley, 
& Engel, 2000). According to the manual, this scale can be 
used to judge whether other MMPI-2 scales are valid and 
whether a response distortion has occurred. A 5-point 
Likert-type scale (1 = very inapplicable to 5 = very appli-
cable) and the sum score (Lie scale) were used in this study. 
One example item is “I do not always tell the truth.”
Finally, German versions of the Edwards SDR scale (24 
items) and the Marlowe–Crowne scale (23 items; Lück & 
Timaeus, 1969) were administered in the same 5-point 
Likert format as above. For the Edwards scale (e.g., “I tend 
to have a restless sleep and often awake during the night”) 
the items were summed. The total scores for each Marlowe–
Crowne subscale were used as representations of attribu-
tion of desirable behavior (first factor; e.g., “No matter who 
I am talking to, I am always a good listener”) and the denial 
of undesirable behavior (second factor; e.g., “I often have 
dreams that I better keep to myself).
Overclaiming. Two German overclaiming questionnaires 
were used. Paulhus (2011, p. 160) pointed out that whereas 
real items are relatively stable, the status of foils could 
change overnight. Items whose content is from popular cul-
ture are especially unstable, which is why it is necessary to 
use a culturally relevant version. The first version was made 
available by the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bil-
dungswesen [Institute for quality development in educa-
tion] in Berlin (see Hülür, Wilhelm, & Schipolowski, 2011). 
It is a self-report measure of academic and everyday knowl-
edge including foils. Each item is rated on a 7-point Likert-
type scale (1 = never heard of it to 7 = know it very well). 
Item content includes three categories: physical sciences, 
civics, and humanities. Responses were dichotomized 
between 1 and 2. If a “real” item was given a rating of 2 or 
higher, it was classified as a hit. Similarly, such a response 
to a foil was rated as a false alarm. For example, partici-
pants have to rate their familiarity with the item “prosa.”
The second overclaiming questionnaire was the 
Vocabulary and Overclaiming Test (VOC-T, Ziegler et al., 
2013). This test consists of 15 items (e.g., “warning”) con-
taining three foils. The VOC-T discriminates between the 
four knowledge domains of science, humanities, civics, and 
mechanics. Two indices labeled accuracy (the hits 
considering the false alarms) and bias (generally answered: 
yes, I know it) can be calculated over these two measure-
ments. However, lack of independence of these two indices 
would be a severe violation of the assumptions underlying 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Therefore, only the bias 
score from each overclaiming measure was used in the 
analyses.1
Overconfidence and Crystallized Intelligence (gc). Participants 
had to answer 30 items (verbal, numeric, and figural; each 
with 10 items) from the knowledge extension module of the 
Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000 R (Amthauer, Brocke, 
Liepmann, & Beauducel, 2001). For each item, the correct 
answer had to be chosen from five options. A total score 
based on the percentage of correct answers was employed. 
One example of a verbal item is “The first chancellor of the 
Federal Republic of Germany was. . . . ” To measure over-
confidence, participants indicated how confident they were 
that each answer to an item was correct (as in Stankov & 
Crawford, 1997) by entering a rounded percentage after 
answering each item. The overconfidence scores were then 
calculated as the difference between the mean of all over-
confidence ratings and the IST total score based on all 
items. Negative scores therefore indicate underconfidence 
and positive scores overconfidence.2
Personality Inventories. To tap fundamental personality traits, 
a brief version of the Big Five Inventory (Rammstedt & 
John, 2005) was used. It comprises 21 items designed to 
measure the Big Five—four from each domain except five 
for Openness. The items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale (1 = very inapplicable to 5 = very applicable). Total 
scores for the five personality scales were used in statistical 
analyses. An example of an extraversion item is “I am full 
of energy and drive.”
The German version of the 40-item Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory (Schuetz, Marcus, & Sellin, 2004) was also 
included. In a forced-choice format, participants have to 
decide between an extremely positive, narcissistic (grandiose 
narcissism) alternative solution and a “normal” one. One 
example for the forced-choice format is “Modesty does not 
become me” versus “I am essentially a modest person.” Each 
respondent received a total score out of 40.
Statistical Analyses
Descriptive statistics were computed with SPSS. EFA using 
maximum likelihood estimation was applied to all of the 
measures as described above. To determine the number of 
factors, we applied Velicer’s (1976) Minimum Average 
Partial test (MAP test) and parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) 
using the psych package (Revelle, 2016) in R. Additionally, 
the eigenvalue >1 rule was applied. The best solution was 
chosen based on interpretability. The first EFA included 
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only the positivity bias measures. This step should reveal 
any common core and how the specific variances cluster. In 
a second EFA, all other measures were also included allow-
ing more clarity of the specific variance within each positiv-
ity bias measure.
Results
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of all measures. 
Among notable values were the correlation between the 
Edwards SDR scale and neuroticism (r = .68, p < .05) and 
the correlation between the MMPI Lie scale and the first 
factor of the Marlowe–Crowne scale (attribution of desir-
able behavior; r = .52, p < .05).
The correlations between the SDR scales and the over-
claiming scale were mostly low. The sole exception was a 
moderate and significant correlation (r = .35) between 
overclaiming and the IM scale. Similar size correlations 
were found for the relations between the SDR scales and the 
overconfidence bias. The highest and significant correlation 
was between overconfidence bias and IM (r = .11). The cor-
relation between overconfidence and overclaiming was 
moderate and significant (r = .26). Thus, there was no 
strong evidence for convergent validity.
The correlations among the personality scales (apart 
from openness and grandiose narcissism) were consistently 
moderate. The highest correlation between overclaiming 
and personality occurred for extraversion (r = .11, p < .05). 
For overconfidence, the highest correlation was with neu-
roticism (r = .11, p < .05). This pattern can be considered 
discriminant validity evidence. For the SDR measures such 
supposedly discriminant, correlations with personality 
scores were often much larger, especially for the Edwards 
scale. Thus, discriminant validity evidence for those scales 
is problematic at best. Notably, crystallized intelligence 
correlated substantially with overconfidence (r = .46), over-
claiming (r = .38), and the SDR scales (.19 < r < .48).
Two EFAs were calculated. In the first step, all eight 
measurements of positivity bias were analyzed. According 
to the chosen factor retention rules, factor solutions with 
one (MAP test), two factors (parallel analysis), and three 
factors (eigenvalue >1 rule) were extracted using a Promax 
rotation. After inspecting the three solutions, the three-fac-
tor solution was chosen as the most interpretable. The first 
three eigenvalues were 2.34, 1.22, and 1.05. The amount of 
variance explained by this solution was 57.63%. Table 3 
presents the factor loadings and shows that the first factor 
was marked by the Marlowe–Crowne scale “denial of unde-
sirable behavior” and the MMPI Lie scale. Furthermore, a 
small loading was on the Edwards SDR scale. This factor 
was called Denying common faults. The second factor com-
prised SDE and a small loading on IM and was named Self-
deceptive enhancement (SDE). Finally, the third factor 
included the Marlowe–Crowne scale “attribution of desir-
able behavior” and a small negative loading on the MMPI 
Lie scale and was named Claiming unlikely virtues. In this 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of all Measures.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
 1.  Extraversion (P)  
 2.  Agreeableness (P) .16* —  
 3.  Conscientiousness (P) .14* .04 —  
 4.  Neuroticism (P) −.24* −.17* −.11* —  
 5.  Openness (P) .22* .05 .09* .03 —  
 6.  Grandiose narcissism (P) −.07 −.05 −.06 .11* <.01 —  
 7.  Edwards SDR scale (SDR) −.36* −.25* −.34* .68* −.04 .15* —  
 8.   First-factor Marlowe–Crowne 
scale (attribution of desirable 
behavior; SDR)
.16* .29* .33* −.08* .21* −.06 −.22* —  
 9.   Second-factor Marlowe–
Crowne scale (denial of 
undesirable behavior; SDR)
−.02 −.29* −.22* .35* −.04 .03 .47* −.20* —  
10.   Self-deceptive enhancement 
(SDR)
−.12* −.22* −.14* .22* .03 .01 .36* <.01 .34* —  
11.  Impression management (SDR) −.04 −.11* .06 .10* −.01 −.01 .11* .03 .21* .26* —  
12.  Lie scale (SDR) .07 −.22* −.29* .22* −.03 .09* .32* −.29* .52* .25* .11* —  
13.  Confidence bias (OCO) .07* −.07 .01 −.11* .05 −.08* −.06 .03 .02 −.03 .11* −.02 —  
14.  Crystallized intelligence (I) −.02 .05 −.02 .04 .02 −.05 .32* .19* .21* .38* .48* .43* .46* —
15.  Overclaiming (OCL) −.11* −.02 −.06 −.05 .02 −.01 .07* −.03 −.04 .03 .35* .15* .26* .38*
Note. In parenthesis (Scale): P = Personality; SDR = socially desirable responding; OCO = Overconfidence; I = Intelligence; OCL = Overclaiming.
*p < .05.
8. ORIGINAL ARTICLES 
OVERCLAIMING, OVERCONFIDENCE, AND SOCIALLY DESORABLE RESPONDING 
 
 
45 
Bensch et al. 7
analysis, overclaiming and overconfidence were not 
explained substantially by any of the factors. Table 4 pres-
ents the factor intercorrelations between all three factors. 
Most of the correlations were small to moderate. The high-
est correlation (r = .33) occurred between the Denying com-
mon faults and the SDE factor.
In a next step, an EFA with the eight measurements of 
positivity bias, personality, and crystallized intelligence 
was investigated. According to the chosen factor retention 
rules, factor solutions with two (MAP test) to six factors 
(parallel analysis and eigenvalue >1 rule) were extracted 
using a Promax rotation. After inspecting each of the factor 
solutions, the six-factor solution was chosen as the most 
plausible. The first six eigenvalues were 3.12, 1.61, 1.31, 
1.20, 1.13, and 1.06. The amount of variance explained by 
this solution was 62.88%. Table 5 presents the factor load-
ings. The table shows that the first factor was marked by 
neuroticism and the Edwards SDR scale. Additionally, there 
were small loadings on grandiose narcissism and a small 
negative cross-loading on extraversion. This factor was 
called Alpha bias following Wiggins (1964). The second 
factor included the Lie scale, both (attribution of desirable 
behavior and denial of undesirable behavior) Marlowe–
Crowne scales, extraversion, and low agreeableness. Again 
referring to Wiggins (1964) the factor was called Gamma 
bias. The third factor was marked by SDE and IM and was 
labeled egoistic bias (see Paulhus, 2002). The third factor is 
a pure SDR factor as it only loads SDR scales. The fourth 
factor was characterized by conscientiousness (C). The fifth 
factor comprised the Marlowe–Crowne scale attribution of 
desirable behavior, extraversion, openness, and agreeable-
ness and was named Plasticity (DeYoung, 2006). Finally, 
the sixth factor included the overconfidence bias and a neg-
ative loading from crystallized intelligence. Following 
Stankov and Crawford (1997), we labeled this factor 
Confidence. Of importance, the overclaiming score was 
again not explained substantially by any of the factors.
Table 6 presents the factor intercorrelations among all 
six factors. Most of the correlations were moderate—apart 
from the small correlation between Confidence and all other 
factors (−.04 < r < .15). The highest correlation (r = .58) 
occurred between the Alpha bias and the egoistic bias. A 
second-order EFA of these correlations resulted in a two-
factor solution (Table 7). Confidence was not substantially 
explained by either of the two factors. The other five first-
order factors mostly fell on the first factor. Only the egoistic 
bias factor was strongly loaded by the second factor but also 
had a substantial loading from the first factor. Thus, the first 
second-order factor contained a mixture of SDR variance 
and personality (see Ziegler & Bühner, 2009) and was 
labeled General SDR factor. The second higher order factor 
basically reflected Egoistic bias.
Discussion
The main goal of this study was to investigate the nomo-
logical network of SDR, overclaiming, and overconfidence 
measures in low-stakes settings. Based on the theoretical 
underpinnings and similarities in operationalization, a com-
mon core reflecting positivity bias was hypothesized. 
Personality, grandiose narcissism, and crystallized intelli-
gence were also assessed to further specify unique variance 
for the different measures. To this end, a test battery includ-
ing a variety of measures from all domains as well as 
Table 3. Factor Loadings After Promax Rotation (First Step).
Denying common 
faults
Self-deceptive 
enhancement
Claiming unlikely 
virtues
Edwards SDR scale 0.39  
Second-factor Marlowe–Crowne scale (denial of 
undesirable behavior)
1.04  
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Lie scale 0.48 −0.27
First-factor Marlowe–Crowne scale (attribution of 
desirable behavior)
0.50
Self-deceptive enhancement 0.99  
Impression management 0.23  
Confidence bias  
Overclaiming  
Note. SDR = socially desirable responding. Loadings smaller than .20 are not displayed.
Table 4. Intercorrelations of Positivity Factors.
Denying 
common faults SDE
Claiming 
unlikely virtues
Denying common faults —  
SDE .33 —  
Claiming unlikely virtues −.31 −.15 —
Note. SDE = self-deceptive enhancement.
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Table 7. A Second-Order EFA.
1 2
Alpha .72 .41
Gamma .36  
Egoistic bias .51 .72
Conscientiousness −.63 .26
Plasticity −.55  
Note. EFA = exploratory factor analysis. Loadings smaller than .20 are 
not displayed.
personality and crystallized intelligence was administered 
to a large sample of students.
Based on the current findings with our specific sample, 
empirical support for the idea of a common core could not 
be found. Instead, the findings showed that there were three 
factors underlying the different measures of positivity bias. 
Interestingly, overclaiming and overconfidence did not load 
on any of the three factors, indicating that these measures 
have more specific than shared variance. In a second step, 
six factors were extracted from all positivity bias measures, 
a Big Five measure, and a test of crystallized intelligence. 
Again, overclaiming was not explained by any of those fac-
tors. Moreover, only one of the factors was exclusively 
marked by SDR scales. This factor was labeled egoistic bias 
and contained the scales SDE, IM, and both (attribution of 
desirable behavior and denial of undesirable behavior) 
Marlowe–Crowne scales. A second-order factor analysis of 
the intercorrelations between the first-order factors revealed 
two second-order factors. Here, overconfidence was no lon-
ger explained by either factor. Moreover, the measures of 
SDR, overclaiming, and overconfidence did not fall onto 
the same factor. Again, the egoistic bias factor separated 
itself and marked the second factor. To sum up, the different 
positivity bias measures were not closely related, and they 
clearly did not share a common core.
Measures of Socially Desirable Responding
SDR was operationalized in the current study with four dif-
ferent commonly used scales: the Marlowe–Crowne Scale 
Table 5. Factor Loadings After Promax Rotation.
Alpha bias Gamma bias Egoistic bias Conscientiousness Plasticity Confidence
Neuroticism .88  
Edwards SDR scale .85  
Grandiose narcissism .21  
Lie scale .67  
Second-factor Marlowe–Crowne scale (denial of 
undesirable behavior)
.55 .25  
Self-deceptive enhancement .65  
Impression management .46  
Conscientiousness .91  
First-factor Marlowe–Crowne scale (attribution 
of desirable behavior)
−.34 .26 .55  
Extraversion −.21 .38 .49  
Openness .40  
Agreeableness −.26 .39  
Confidence bias .74
Crystallized intelligence −.45
Overclaiming  
Note. SDR = socially desirable responding. Loadings smaller than .20 are not displayed.
Table 6. Factor Intercorrelations.
Alpha Gamma Egoistic Conscientiousness Plasticity Confidence
Alpha —  
Gamma .28 —  
Egoistic .58 .22 —  
Conscientiousness −.31 −.26 −.11 —  
Plasticity −.39 −.15 −.21 .37 —  
Confidence −.04 .15 .11 .08 .05 —
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(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), the Edwards (1957) SD scale, 
the BIDR (Paulhus, 1998), and the Lie scale from the 
MMPI. In the first step, variance in theses scales was 
explained by three factors—not the expected one-factor 
solution reflecting the shared common core. Consequently, 
the content of each measure captures unique variance. To 
account for the often reported shared variance with person-
ality, a Big Five and a grandiose narcissism measure were 
added as well. This step also allowed to further characterize 
the specific variance composition of each measure. A sec-
ond EFA yielded a six-factor solution. Four of them were 
marked by SDR measures. The first factor, Alpha bias, was 
marked by the Edwards SDR scale, neuroticism, grandiose 
narcissism, and by a negative cross loading on extraversion. 
In accordance with Wiggins, who also found the Edward’s 
scale marking his first factor, the factor was labeled Alpha 
bias. Second, the Gamma bias was characterized by the Lie 
scale, the first and the second factors of the Marlowe–
Crowne scale, and two personality scales extraversion and 
agreeableness. Again labeling was based on Wiggins’s find-
ings, which showed a factor marked by the Lie scale. Factor 
three was labeled egoistic bias factor and the fifth factor, 
labeled plasticity, was marked by the first scale of the 
Marlowe–Crowne scale (attribution of desirable behavior) 
and the three personality scales extraversion, openness, and 
agreeableness. The term egoistic bias was borrowed from 
Paulhus’s (2002) taxonomy and reflects the theme inherent 
in SDE and IM (agency). The label “plasticity” was bor-
rowed from DeYoung (2006). Interestingly, this factor has 
no substantial loadings on any of the SDR or other positiv-
ity bias measures. It has to be noted here that Paulhus (2002) 
argued that the egoistic bias is associated with Alpha. This, 
however, does not mean that the factors are isomorphic. In 
fact, our results replicate those findings revealing a correla-
tion of .58 between the factors.
Importantly, the factor intercorrelations in Table 6 under-
line the problematic overlap between the SDR scales and 
personality test scores. Thus, the present findings are fur-
ther evidence showing that the social desirability scales and 
personality measures are difficult to differentiate—which 
originally caused the debate on substance versus style. 
Exceptions were the SDE and the IM scale, which yielded 
the egoistic bias factor. This factor was virtually free of sub-
stantial overlap with the other measures used, specifically 
the personality measures. However, the factor correlated 
with the Alpha bias reflecting shared variance most likely 
due to SDR (see Paulhus, 2002). Thus, there seems to be a 
common core here that reflects an egoistic theme (Paulhus, 
2002) free of substantial overlaps with personality.
Thus, the first-order EFA revealed interesting loading 
patterns with regard to the pairings of SDR measures and 
personality. Only neuroticism and the Edwards scale both 
were exclusively explained by the same latent factor, Alpha. 
This is somewhat surprising considering Paulhus’s (2002) 
earlier findings which put the Edwards scale on Alpha but 
Emotional Stability somewhere between Alpha and Gamma. 
However, Paulhus used residuals of self-ratings where 
other-ratings had been partialed out. Thus, bias variance 
was operationalized more directly as the deviation of the 
self-rating from the view others have. This idea was recently 
propagated in a more differentiated way by McAbee and 
Connelly (2016). Those authors used the term identity to 
describe the deviation of the self-rating from the view 
shared by the self and others on the target. Our finding, that 
is, the Edward’s scale and neuroticism loaded by the same 
factor, indicates that the substance overlap between the 
Edwards scale and personality might lie within the domain 
of neuroticism.
Similar arguments could be made for the second factor, 
Gamma bias. Here it was Extraversion that loaded on the 
factor otherwise dominated by SDR scales. The plasticity 
factor was mainly marked by personality test scores 
(Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness). However, the 
strongest loading occurred for the Marlowe–Crowne scale 
claiming positive behavior. Thus, this factor also represents 
a mixture of substance and style. Here, the agentic theme is 
very obvious. The third factor, egoistic bias, did not explain 
substantial amounts of variance within any of the personal-
ity scores. This could at first glance be viewed as support 
for these scales as hinted at above. However, two arguments 
counter this initial impression. First, this factor was strongly 
correlated with the Alpha bias factor. Second, the second-
order factor analysis located this factor on both second-
order dimensions. Thus, despite the strong common core 
reflecting an egoistic bias, both measures still contain sub-
stantial amounts of substantive variance evident in the 
cross-loading in the second-order EFA as well as in the cor-
relation between egoistic bias and alpha bias. However, the 
latter two findings again underscore the role of neuroticism 
in bridging the gap between SDR and personality measures. 
This seems intuitive considering the clearly undesirable 
connotation of neuroticism even under low-stakes condi-
tions. To sum up, the first-order EFA revealed interesting 
loading patterns confirming prior research findings in terms 
of general SD factors (Alpha and Gamma) and themes 
(especially egoistic). The previously reported problematic 
overlap between personality and SDR measures was also 
replicated in a second EFA. However, a more fine-grained 
picture revealed that specific personality–SDR relations 
could be distilled.
Of further importance is the second-order EFA based on 
the intercorrelations between the six first-order factors. The 
results speak against the possibility of completely disentan-
gling SDR and personality. We found a very strong first fac-
tor with substantial loadings from all first-order factors 
(including Conscientiousness showing that there also was 
variance due to SDR). In addition, we found a second higher 
order factor mostly reflecting egoistic bias. Perhaps Paulhus’s 
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idea of two themes might be reflected in the emergence of 
two higher order factors (also see Wiggins, 1964). It could 
even be argued that the second higher order factor might have 
more substance and less style.
Alternatively, the first factor could reflect a general SDR 
factor (Bäckström, 2007). The fact that the egoistic bias 
formed an additional factor might be due to the anonymous 
situation. Had the data been collected in a high-stakes 
assessment situation where people are likely to distort a 
broader variety of personality traits, a different result might 
have occurred (Schmit & Ryan, 1993). In such a setting, a 
one-factor solution may be just as likely as a two-factor 
solution clearly reflecting the two themes agentic and mor-
alistic (communal). The latter could occur if specific job 
profiles would call for those themes (Pauls & Crost, 2005). 
In fact, Pauls and Crost (2004) argued that “in faking condi-
tions social desirability scales do not seem to provide addi-
tional diagnostic information beyond that derived from 
personality scales.” (Pauls & Crost, 2004, p. 1149).
Regardless of these interesting loading patterns and spe-
cific relations between measures of substance and style, a 
first conclusion with this special sample is that typical SDR 
measures form a close nomological network. Moreover, this 
network is strongly entwined with substance, that is, per-
sonality measures. As a consequence of the present study, 
those scales should not be used in low-stakes settings until 
the substance versus style question is answered. The current 
findings dispute the possibility of using SDR scales to mea-
sure a positivity bias that is independent of substance.
Interestingly, neither overclaiming nor overconfidence 
was related to either of the factors described so far. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that there is no overlap 
between the constructs behind these operationalizations 
negating the assumptions of a common core or even a 
shared nomological net.
Overclaiming
No factor explained substantial variance in overclaiming 
despite some overlap at the level of zero-order correlations 
(e.g., with crystallized intelligence). This shows the impor-
tance of analyzing correlational patterns instead of relying 
on single zero-order correlations when trying to explore the 
nomological net of several related constructs. In fact, the 
communality for overclaiming was nearly zero. This sup-
ports the notion that overclaiming can be measured free 
from personality or cognitive ability. Ziegler et al. (2013) 
also confirmed the independence of overclaiming and fluid 
intelligence. This also means, though, that overclaiming has 
its own nomological network not including relationships 
with SDR scales, personality nor intelligence. In Paulhus’s 
(2002) model of SDR, overclaiming can be located within 
self-enhancement (Paulhus et al., 2003). The current results 
show that this earlier finding by Paulhus et al. could not be 
replicated, at least when self-enhancement is measured with 
common SDR scales. It is important to note that this does 
not necessarily show that overclaiming does not capture 
self-enhancement or SDR. In fact, the opposite might be 
true. Due to the critical overlap between SDR scales and 
personality, overclaiming measures might allow a more 
direct access to the actual psychological process underlying 
self-enhancement. However, further research utilizing 
experimental designs and not only relying on correlational 
analyses is necessary to test this assumption. Nevertheless, 
the finding that overclaiming and SDR measures do not 
share a common core or nomological network also means 
that overclaiming measures are free of the typical problems 
associated with SDR measures namely the substance versus 
style issue.
Overconfidence
The sixth factor, Confidence, was characterized by the 
overconfidence scale, and the crystallized intelligence mea-
sure. This factor is therefore best described as a knowledge 
factor or a metacognitive ability factor. More important 
though, there was no substantial loading of this factor on 
overclaiming indices or SDR scales. Moreover, the correla-
tions of this factor with the factors representing SDR and 
personality were very low. In fact, within the second-order 
EFA no substantial loading on either of the two factors 
occurred. Thus, based on the current findings, overconfi-
dence cannot be recommended as a way to operationalize 
overclaiming. Likewise, overconfidence cannot be regarded 
as part of the nomological net of SDR measures. The find-
ings support the notion of self-confidence as a meta- 
cognition (see, e.g., Kleitman & Stankov, 2007) rather than 
the idea of using overconfidence as a measure of deception 
(Anderson et al., 2012).
To sum up, six first-order factors named Alpha bias, 
Gamma bias, Egoistic bias, conscientiousness, plasticity, 
and confidence were found. Overclaiming was not explained 
by any of the six factors. Table 4 shows that the four factors 
of SDR were correlated with each other but not with the 
metacognitive ability factor confidence. Taken together, 
this shows that the investigated constructs do not overlap. 
Thus, different operationalizations of positivity bias (SDR 
scales, overclaiming, and overconfidence) do not share a 
common core or have entwined nomological networks.
Practical Implications
With regard to the nomological network and only in low-
stakes settings it is possible to separate overclaiming from 
personality and crystallized intelligence. By contrast, SDR 
measures did not turn out to be distinct from personality in 
this study. As discussed above, as long as it remains unclear 
whether the factors found represent substance or style, the 
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SDR measures cannot be recommended to be used in low-
stakes research settings. Exceptions here might be the scales 
loaded by egoistic bias—the SDE and IM scales. These two 
scales seem to be free of personality. However, the assess-
ment here was conducted under anonymous and low-stakes 
conditions. Generalizing to other settings is not warranted. 
In fact, there is research supporting the use of MMPI valid-
ity scales in clinical settings (e.g., Steffan, Morgan, Lee, & 
Sellbom, 2010), which can be considered high stakes. A 
similar conclusion may be drawn regarding overconfidence, 
which was unrelated to any of the other SDR measures. 
Considering that it was not even constructed to actually 
capture such response distortions, we conclude that it 
should not be used to capture forms of positivity bias in 
personality research.
The outlook for overclaiming is more promising. 
Researchers interested in whether their respondents have a 
tendency to present themselves in an overly positive way 
could try to gauge this by integrating an overclaiming mea-
sure. There is empirical evidence supporting this claim. 
Bing et al. (2011) provided first empirical evidence to lend 
support to the notion of overclaiming capturing SDR. In 
their study, hierarchical regression analyses were used to 
examine whether two SDR measures or overclaiming acted 
as supressor when predicting performance. In the first step, 
cognitive ability was entered as a covariate and was a sig-
nificant predictor of performance. In a next step, achieve-
ment striving was added and incrementally predicted 
performance. In the third step, two SDR measures failed to 
add to the prediction of performance. These results were 
illustrated for both instruction conditions: honest and fake 
good response described above. Only when adding over-
claiming in the fake good condition did a case of classical 
suppression occur. This result was interpreted as showing 
that the overclaiming technique taps individual differences 
in faking.
Additional validation comes from Kemper and Menold 
(2014), who showed that self-enhancement measurements, 
among them an overclaiming test (VOC-T), are good pre-
dictors for identifying falsification in surveys. Those 
authors investigated the stylistic responding between genu-
ine and falsified interviews and the results showed that “fal-
sifiers generally overestimate the putative interviewees’ 
tendency to self-enhance by exaggerating positive and min-
imizing negative attributes or by overclaiming knowledge” 
(Kemper & Menold, 2014, p. 97). Finally, Paulhus and 
Dubois (2014) demonstrated the value of measuring over-
claiming tendencies in assessing class performance. 
Whereas knowledge accuracy predicted better final course 
grades, knowledge overclaiming predicted poorer final 
grades. Apparently, those who exaggerate their abilities pay 
a price in overall educational performance.
It should be mentioned that there are also studies casting 
a less positive light on the interpretation of overclaiming as 
a positivity bias. For example, Feeney and Goffin (2015) 
did not advise the use of overclaiming for detecting general 
faking but suggested instead to use overclaiming items with 
specific job-relevant contents. Whether this suggestion 
really improves the ability to capture positivity bias still 
needs be seen. Regardless, the current study, as well as the 
cited research, indicates that overclaiming is more likely 
than SDR or overconfidence to capture positivity bias inde-
pendent of personality and crystallized intelligence.
Limitations and Outlook
For the first time, a nomological network of SDR, over-
claiming, and overconfidence was empirically investi-
gated. Further studies are needed to confirm these results 
by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis and by vary-
ing samples and contexts. Note that the disproportionate 
representation of the three types of positivity bias may 
have affected our results. In particular, we included more 
SDR tests than other tests to cover the broader variety in 
these measures.
Only aggregated scores for overclaiming, overconfi-
dence, and crystallized intelligence were used. A more fine-
grained approach differentiating between different 
knowledge areas should be conducted in the future to ensure 
that specific relations were not obliterated by aggregating. 
We would argue, however, that overclaiming and overcon-
fidence are much more homogeneous, and it seems unlikely 
that using more of these measures would substantially 
change the findings.
In addition, the inclusion of more extensive inventories3 
for measuring personality and intelligence will be impor-
tant for broadening the nomological network. Of interest 
would be a detailed description of which personality facets 
explain variance in the different constructs. This extension 
would further help disentangle substance and style. 
Moreover, we cannot make a general statement about nar-
cissism because we used the NPI that captures only grandi-
ose narcissism and neglects the vulnerable form of 
narcissism.
As described, SDR is dependent on the kind of receiver. 
The current study was an anonymous online survey where 
there was no clear audience. Hence, the IM component of 
SDR may not play a role in our results. Without an audi-
ence, one cannot implicate this most blatant kind of SDR, 
often called faking (Ziegler et al., 2015). However, research 
by Pauls and Crost (2004) indicated that distorted self-pre-
sentation depends on the situational context and not on the 
audience. Their example deals with managerial skills which 
are expected to reflect high agency. Pauls and Crost could 
demonstrate that SDR scores were faked just as personality 
scales were. Future research should therefore investigate 
the nomological network of these constructs in different set-
tings such as real applicant settings.
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To sum up, the current study found that the implicit 
assumption of a common core within a shared nomological 
network of SDR measures, overclaiming, and overconfi-
dence could not be empirically supported. Of all the mea-
sures, only overclaiming turned out to be fully independent 
of personality and crystallized intelligence.
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Notes
1. We also conducted the EFA with the linearly dependent 
scores, but the results were the same.
2. We also conducted the EFA with separated overconfidence 
and gc, but the results were the same.
3. It should be mentioned that the Lie scale of the MMPI-2 was 
originally not developed or validated as a stand-alone tool or 
a Likert-type scale.
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Abstract 
Faking remains an unsolved problem in high stakes personality assessments. Importantly, the 
evaluation of so-called faking-detection scales differs between psychological disciplines. One of 
the reasons for this might be the unclear nature of actual faking behavior. In the present study, we 
aimed to apply a modeling technique introduced by Ziegler et al. (2015) that allows to capture 
interindividual differences in faking behavior as a latent variable. We used this approach to isolate 
variance due to experimentally induced faking good and faking bad of the Big Five, and we 
predicted this variance with a variety of theoretically relevant constructs (socially desirable 
responding, overclaiming, and dark triad traits). We tested a sample (n = 233) divided between 
two experimental conditions and n = 167 persons in a control condition twice (honest/faking and 
honest/honest). The application of the modeling approach for all five personality domains was 
successful. In a second step, factor scores for all faking variables derived from these prior 
analyses were tested for homogeneity within each faking condition. Results showed that whereas 
faking was neither homogeneous within each condition (i.e., faking good vs. faking bad), nor was 
it homogeneous across conditions. Thus, faking is a complex psychological process that is 
responsive to specific situational demands. In a final step, the faking variables representing faking 
good and faking bad were regressed onto scores from other measures. The results indicated that 
the common variance shared by some social desirability scales predicted faking. We discuss 
theoretical and practical implications of these findings. 
The Public Significance Statement 
This study suggests that faking in personality questionnaires strongly depends on the situational 
context and even the questions asked. Additionally, it could be shown that faking good is 
influenced by Machiavellian tendencies. 
 
Keywords: faking, socially desirable responding, overclaiming, dark triad, Latent Change 
Score Model  
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The influence of faking is a pervasive topic in psychological literature. The breadth of 
findings varies from studies concluding that faking has a substantial effect on test scores’ 
construct validity (Ziegler & Buehner, 2009) to studies indicating that such response distortions 
affect the test scores’ criterion-related validity (Holden, 2007). One important research branch 
focuses on the detection of faking. Whereas research for most other aspects related to faking 
seems to yield comparable results across different psychological fields, research focusing on 
faking detection often yields findings seemingly in strong contrast between clinical research and 
research from an I/O context. Particularly the usefulness of so-called social desirability scales is 
being judged differently. One aspect potentially contributing to this controversy is the 
heterogeneous way in which faking has been operationalized and modeled. Especially modeling 
faking, that is capturing the unique variance associated with this psychological process, is 
challenging. Yet, only a conclusive modeling approach will ultimately allow to gauge the 
usefulness of scales aiming at detecting faking. Whereas some researchers have favored 
difference scores between honest and faked conditions (Baer, Wetter, Nichols, Greene, & Berry, 
1995), others have relied on between-person designs comparing, for example, applicants and job 
incumbents (Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004) or known-group designs (Chmielewski, Zhu, 
Burchett, Bury, & Bagby, 2017). All of these approaches have advantages but are also subject to 
specific disadvantages. It is important to note that these differences in operationalization might 
impede the exploration of actual faking behavior. Here, we will utilize a methodological approach 
to modeling faking suggested by Ziegler, Maaß, Griffith, and Gammon (2015). Importantly, we 
will use a fake good and a fake bad condition, thereby trying to bridge the gap between prior 
contrasting findings as stated above.   
In our opinion, different definitions of faking and different methods to operationalize 
faking have contributed to the plethora of different results. In this study, we will therefore first 
present a definition of faking we adhere to, and second, an approach to model it as a latent 
variable.  
Definition of Faking 
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Terms such as social desirable responding, malingering, impression management, 
overreporting, underreporting, self-enhancement, or faking are often used interchangeably. 
Unfortunately, this ignores otherwise postulated important differences. Paulhus (2002) reviewed 
the abundant literature and based the interpretation of his empirically driven analyses on this to 
conclude that social desirability is a hierarchical construct. Underneath this umbrella term, he 
postulated four specific facets, based on the theme of the bias and the target. The four facets are 
self-deceptive enhancement and agency management reflecting an egoistic bias and self-deceptive 
denial and communion management reflecting a moralistic bias. Importantly, only agency and 
communion management are considered conscious and deliberate acts.  
When practitioners use scales to detect faked answers it is often exactly such conscious 
and deliberate distortion that is being looked for. Yet, some of the scales used were specifically 
designed to capture unconscious response distortion. The lack of attention to this difference has 
recently been pointed out for the field of clinical psychology (Perinelli & Gremigni, 2016). 
Moreover, the term faking in most definitions clearly refers to these facets reflecting conscious 
response distortions. For example, Ziegler et al. (2012a) wrote, “faking represents a response set 
aimed at providing a portrayal of the self that helps a person to achieve personal goals. Faking 
occurs when this response set is activated by situational demands and person characteristics to 
produce systematic differences in test scores that are not due to the attribute of interest” (p. 8). 
One of the most basic conclusions that can be drawn from this and which is in line with earlier 
work by J. S. Wiggins (1973) and Paulhus (2002) is that, depending on the perceived demands of 
the situation, two different forms of faking can occur: faking good and faking bad. Faking good 
tends to occur in job contexts where applicants give a response to personality items to enhance 
their chances of being selected. However, even in a job context, faking bad scenarios are feasible, 
for example, when people do not really want to work and would rather receive unemployment 
compensation. Faking bad scenarios can also occur in clinical contexts where the term 
malingering is used, which is not uncommon as shown in several studies (Hall & Hall, 2012). We 
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will use the term faking from here on, which covers faking bad (malingering) and faking good and 
is meant in the sense of the definition by Ziegler, MacCann, and Roberts. 
Importantly, in both contexts so-called social desirability scales are often used to detect 
faking despite the fact that some of those scales were designed to capture unintentional response 
distortions. As mentioned above, whereas studies focusing on faking good often conclude that 
such scales are of little use (e.g., Griffith & Peterson, 2008), studies focusing on faking bad 
conclude the opposite just as often (Bianchini et al., 2017). Interestingly, despite the differences 
between a fake bad and a fake good situation that are to be assumed, prior research often only 
focused one of the two. This limited chances to directly compare findings. 
The current study will employ the same research design to a fake bad and a fake good 
scenario in order to directly compare the results. Specifically, we will directly compare in how far 
faking bad and faking good are comparable processes and, maybe most importantly, how 
differences in faking can be explained with widely-used detection scales.  
Modeling Faking 
In order to statistically model faking, researchers first need theoretical models of faking. 
In the literature, several faking models have been proposed (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin 
& Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006; Robie et al., 2007; Snell et 
al., 1999; Ziegler, 2011). Roughly, these models form two broad groups: On the one hand, there 
are models that describe how faking intentions are built. On the other hand, there are models that 
focus on actual faking behavior. Faking intention models deal with antecedents or determinants 
that lead to faking, whereas faking behavior models attempt to describe actual interindividual 
differences in faking behavior that occur when working on a test.  
One prominent intention to fake model was described by Ellingson and McFarland (2011). 
In their theoretical model, they used the Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy (VIE) theory to 
describe the motivation that drives faking. This theory can be traced back to the formulation of 
expectancy theory by Vroom (1964) and to the expectancy-value model by Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975) which have had a strong influence on most fields of psychological research. In addition to 
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three proximal factors, valence (personal satisfaction with the aid of faking), instrumentality 
(perceived necessity of faking), and expectancy (confidence in the ability to fake successfully), 
the ability to fake is an important determinant in this model. Goffin and Boyd (2009) described a 
similar faking model. However, their model differed in three essential ways from Ellingson and 
McFarland’s model: “its focus on item-level responding” (Goffin & Boyd, 2009, p. 153), the 
perceived ability to fake, and “a direct causal effect of perceived ability on the motivation to fake 
a given item” (Goffin & Boyd, 2009, p. 154). They complemented the model with two factors: 
first, the need to fake (e.g., the need to get a job or the wish to claim disability), and second, the 
perceived discrepancy between the desired response and the real response to the item. Thus, the 
two models exemplify the two different forms mentioned above: models dealing with faking 
intentions and models dealing with faking behavior.       
Whereas Ellingson and McFarland (2011) argued that “prediction of behavior is a messy 
endeavor” (p. 326), Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) empirically demonstrated that intentions to fake 
are indeed related to faking behavior. The faking behavior model by Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) 
is a combination of the models by McFarland and Ryan (2000) and Snell et al. (1999). It contains 
antecedents to the intention to fake (i.e., perceptions of the situation, willingness to fake, ability to 
fake, conscientiousness, and emotional stability), which then lead to faking behavior. In all of 
these models, faking behavior is regarded only as an outcome. Differences in actual faking 
behavior are mostly not targeted, which is most likely a tribute paid to the difficulties involved in 
capturing these differences.  
Models focusing on actual faking behavior have therefore mostly relied on qualitative 
data. Robie et al. (2007) focused on actual faking behavior on noncognitive measures and 
employed a verbal protocol analysis. They were able to show that participants differ in their 
motivation to fake. Moreover, differences in actual faking behavior manifested in the way the 
response scale was used. Relying on quantitative data, these differences were categorized into 
three response styles: honest responding, slight faking, and extreme faking (Zickar et al., 2004). 
Ziegler (2011) also used a think-aloud technique to investigate actual faking behavior and 
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proposed a model that links personality and situational demands to interindividual differences in 
faking. This model is based on the idea that item responses are based on four distinct phases: item 
comprehension, information retrieval, judgment, and mapping. It was proposed that personality 
differences and differences in situational perception influence all of these four phases. Of interest 
to this study is that Ziegler proposed that dark personality traits such as narcissism but also the 
tendency to overclaim particularly influence the mapping phase of item answering (i.e., the 
selection of the answer category). If this were true, dark personality traits or overclaiming should 
contribute to differences in faking behavior.  
More specifically, there is some research that has focused on how faking is related to 
narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy (Maaß & Ziegler, 2017; Paulhus, 1998; Paulhus 
& Williams, 2002). The construct most scrutinized is narcissism. Paulhus (1998) explained, “self-
enhancement has traditionally played a central role in diagnosing the narcissistic personality” (p. 
1198). Along this line of thinking, Maaß and Ziegler (2017) varied situational demands and 
reported that “narcissists always promoted themselves more favorably” (Maaß & Ziegler, 2017, p. 
487). However, such findings have often involved other ratings or complicated experimental 
setups. Thus, actual faking behavior has usually not been directly modeled. As was mentioned 
before, the main reason for this could be the lack of a method that can be used to capture 
interindividual differences in faking behavior.  
In other studies, faking was measured with questionnaires for measuring response 
distortion such as scales for measuring socially desirable responding. Bensch et al. (2017) 
investigated the nomological network of scores derived from scales measuring socially desirable 
responding, overclaiming, and overconfidence as the three most widely used response distortion 
measures and were able to show that only overclaiming scores seem to be distinct from 
personality and crystallized intelligence. Self-deceptive enhancement and impression management 
were also found to be largely but not totally independent of these other constructs. The review by 
Perinelli and Gremigni (2016) summarized a lot of clinical studies on social desirability in clinical 
settings. In their conclusion those authors also stress the problem of differentiating between 
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variance due to socially desirable responding and due to actual personality differences in such 
scales. Thus, studies using such scales to identify faking and explore its impact on a test score’s 
psychometric properties are running the risk of confounding differences in faking with real 
personality differences.   
To overcome this problem,  Ziegler et al. (2015) proposed a modeling approach that is 
based on latent difference score models (LDSM; McArdle, 2001) and factor mixture models 
(FMMs). LDSMs allow researchers to capture quantitative differences between faked and honest 
responses. FMMs allow researchers to model qualitative differences in faking behavior, that is, to 
distinguish between slight and extreme faking. It is important to mention that this model allows 
researchers to capture actual differences in faking behavior, which can then be predicted by other 
assessed constructs. Through this, it is possible to explore the nature of faking and to investigate 
its nomological network. For instance, Ziegler et al. (2015) investigated the personality domain of 
conscientiousness and how corresponding test scores were affected by faking behavior. Findings 
showed sufficient variance in faking behavior but did not support the idea of slight and extreme 
faking. In addition to Ziegler and Buehner (2009) and Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006), this was one 
of the few times a statistical model that could specify actual faking behavior was postulated and 
tested. The present study will also utilize this modeling approach by Ziegler et al. (2015) but 
without the FMM part given that the idea of faking styles was not supported in prior analyses 
(Ziegler & Kemper, 2013).   
Before describing the aims and the hypotheses of the present study, we want to stress the 
importance of faking for clinical as well as I/O contexts as evidenced by the many studies in both 
research fields. From a theoretical perspective the corresponding terms faking bad and faking 
good seem to imply similar psychological processes. However, this has not been directly tested to 
the best of our knowledge. Moreover, considering that social desirability scales are more 
successful in clinical settings (Steffan, Morgan, Lee, & Sellbom, 2010) than in I/O contexts 
(Griffith & Peterson, 2008) it could even be assumed that the psychological processes underlying 
faking good and faking bad differ. Yet, considering that faking is influenced by the situation and 
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the person, it is important to keep one of these influences constant in order to compare faking 
good and faking bad processes. We chose to keep the context constant thereby aiming at similar 
situational influences. Assuming that faking good and faking bad are likely behaviors in I/O 
contexts but not necessarily in clinical contexts, we chose such a context. While this limits 
generalizability, it is still likely that the findings are of importance to both contexts.   
To sum up, there is empirical and theoretical support for the idea of faking as a result of a 
person-situation interaction. The variance caused by this interaction can successfully be captured 
in latent variable models. Such models allow researchers to further investigate the aspects of 
personality that underlie faking behavior. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that faking bad and 
faking good do not represent the same psychological process which would explain why prior 
studies from an I/O context came to different conclusions than studies from a clinical context with 
regard to judging the usefulness of social desirability scales.  
Aims of the Present Study and Hypotheses 
Replication and Expansion 
First, we wanted to replicate the analyses by Ziegler et al. (2015) and extend them to all 
domains of the five factor model (FFM): Extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, and 
conscientiousness. The model has so far been used only for conscientiousness (Ziegler et al., 
2015). Research has shown, however, that faking can affect all aspects of personality that are 
relevant to a specific job (Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006). Scores on 
conscientiousness and emotional resilience (neuroticism) seem to be important in all work areas 
and are, therefore, always susceptible to distortion in high stakes settings (Ziegler & Buehner, 
2009). Thus, the present study used specific job ads that also emphasized the characteristics of 
extraversion, agreeableness, and openness to ensure faking in all domains. Furthermore, we used 
both fake good and fake bad groups to test the model for both faking situations and to further our 
understanding of the actual psychological processes underlying faking. Based on factor scores 
from modeling faking for each domain, we also tested whether faking across the five domains can 
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be explained by one latent variable. This idea of a homogeneous faking variable acting across all 
five domains is often (at least implicitly) assumed when talking about faking.  
Faking Good versus Faking Bad  
Second, we investigated whether the psychological processes of faking would be found to 
be homogenous across faking conditions. That is, we tested models of faking bad and faking good 
for measurement invariance.  
The Nature of Faking 
Besides modeling faking as a latent variable, we tested the predictive power of several 
constructs with regard to actual faking behavior. This allows a head-to-head comparison of widely 
used faking-detection scales with regard to detecting faking bad and faking good. On the basis of 
prior research, we utilized overclaiming, self-enhancement, impression management, and the dark 
triad as the most promising candidates for constructs underlying faking behavior. With regard to 
the study by Bensch et al. (2017), we expected that overclaiming, self-deceptive enhancement, 
and impression management scores would predict faking because these scores have been found to 
be largely independent of other scores capturing other constructs such as crystallized intelligence 
or the the Big Five. With respect to the dark triad, we expected an influence of narcissism scores 
especially within the faking good condition. With respect to Machiavellianism scores, we 
expected a positive relation with faking because of the definition that respondents who score high 
on Machiavellianism “behave in a cold and manipulative fashion” (Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 
557). With respect to psychopathy scores and the definition of antisocial behavior, we expected 
only a small correlation with faking. One result of these analyses will be insight into the ability of 
social desirability scales to identify differences in faking good and bad.  
Method 
Sample and Procedure 
The total sample consisted of N = 400 participants. The experimental group (EG) included 
n1 = 233 (87.7% female) participants, and their average age was 33.98 (SD = 15.27). They were 
recruited from two distribution lists of a German university. The first list is a participant list with 
8. ORIGINAL ARTICLES 
THE NATURE OF FAKING 
 
 
62 
more than 5.000 volunteers including students but mostly people from the community. The 
second list is a student list. Participants were rewarded with ten Euro or course credit. The data 
from the control group (CG) were originally collected for the study by Ziegler and Buehner 
(2009). This subsample consisted of n2 = 167 (76.6% female) participants, which were mainly 
undergraduate students who also received course credit.  
Measures 
We used a total of eight instruments. Organized into the categories of socially desirable 
responding, overclaiming, and personality, each test is described in detail below. Descriptive 
statistics and estimates of construct reliabilities supporting the test score interpretations in the first 
measurement occasion are given in Table 1.   
Socially Desirable Responding (SDR). To assess self-deceptive enhancement and 
impression management, we used a German version of the BIDR “Ein Inventar zur Erfassung von 
zwei Faktoren sozialer Erwünschtheit” [an inventory for measuring two factors of social 
desirability] (Musch, Brockhaus, & Bröder, 2002). The two scales are represented by 10 items 
each. Respondents rate the extent to which items are relatively consistent with their typical 
behaviors or attitudes. Items were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not true to 7 = 
absolutely true). The sum scores of each of the two scales were used as representations of self-
deceptive enhancement (SDE) and impression management (IM). An example item from the SDE 
scale is “I am really certain of my judgments,” and an item from the IM scale is “I never swear.”  
As a second measure of socially desirable responding, we used the lie scale from the 
German version of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Hathaway, 
McKinley, & Engel, 2000). According to the manual, this scale allows researchers to judge 
whether a test is valid or not and whether response distortion has occurred. We used a 5-point 
Likert-type scale (1 = very inapplicable to 5 = very applicable) and the sum score of the 15 items 
in this study. An example item is “I do not always tell the truth.” 
Finally, German versions of the Edwards social desirability (SD) scale (24 items) and the 
Marlowe-Crowne scale (23 items; Lück & Timaeus, 1969) were administered with the same 5-
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point Likert-type scale as above. For the Edwards scale (example item: “I tend to have restless 
sleep and am often awake during the night”), we summed the items. We used the total scores for 
each Marlowe-Crowne subscale as representations of the attribution of desirable behavior (first 
factor; an example item is “No matter who I am talking to, I am always a good listener”) and the 
denial of undesirable behavior (second factor; an example item is “I often have dreams that I 
better keep to myself”). 
Overclaiming. We used two German overclaiming questionnaires. A unique aspect of this 
method is the use of nonexistent items- devised things- (at most 20%) called foils. Paulhus (2012) 
pointed out that whereas real items are relatively stable, the status of foils can change overnight. 
Items whose content is from popular culture are especially unstable, and this is why it is necessary 
to use a culturally valid and adapted version. The first questionnaire was made available by the 
Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen [Institute for quality development in 
education] (see Hülür, Wilhelm, & Schipolowski, 2011). It is a self-report measure of academic 
and everyday knowledge including foils. The test items are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 
= never heard of it to 7 = know it very well). Respondents rate their familiarity with the items that 
were derived from three categories: physical sciences, civics, and humanities. Each category 
consists of 15 items containing three foils. Responses were dichotomized between 1 and 2. If a 
“real” item was given a rating of 2 or higher, it was classified as a hit. Likewise, such a response 
to a foil was rated as a false alarm. For example, participants were asked to rate their familiarity 
with the real existing item “prosa.”   
The second overclaiming questionnaire was The Vocabulary and Overclaiming Test 
(Ziegler, Kemper, & Rammstedt, 2013). This test consists of 15 items containing three foils. The 
VOC-T discriminates between the four knowledge domains of science, humanities, civics, and 
mechanics. Two indices named accuracy (the hits considering the false alarms) and bias 
(generally answered: yes, I know it) were calculated for these measures.  
Personality inventories. Participants completed the German version of the 240 NEO-PI-
R items (Ostendorf & Angleitner, 2004). The NEO-PI-R aims to assess a five-factor model with 
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six facets each and with eight items per facet. The five factors are neuroticism, extraversion, 
openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Participants were asked to rate 
themselves on typical behaviors. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sum scores for the five personality scales were used in 
the analyses.  
The second personality inventory was a German translation of the early version of the 
Short Dark Triad Scale (SD3; Jones & Paulhus, 2014) with 28 items. The test consists of nine 
items each for narcissism and psychopathy and 10 items for Machiavellianism. All were rated on 
a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sum scores 
were used in all analyses. 
Procedure 
Experimental group. Participants were first asked to fill out measures of social 
desirability, overclaiming, and personality with regular instructions in an online survey. Here it 
was not allowed to leave items blank. After an average of one week, participants came to the 
laboratory for a second time. At this second visit, participants were randomly assigned to receive 
specific instructions (fake bad vs. fake good). The instructions comprised the job characteristics of 
an internship (see Appendix A). Importantly, within both faking conditions participants were told 
to imagine that they were currently unemployed. In the fake good scenario, participants were 
further told to imagine that they really wanted the offered internship. In contrast, participants in 
the fake bad condition were told that they should imagine not wanting to lose unemployment 
benefits due to making an internship. Moreover, all participants were told that a test expert would 
look at the results and search for faking. This would either result in not getting the desired 
internship or being reported to the unemployment agency. This was done to encourage realistic 
faking behavior (Rogers, 1997). After reading their specific instructions, the two experimental 
groups were asked to fill out the personality questionnaire according to the instructions they had 
received.    
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Control group. The control group came from the study by Ziegler and Buehner (2009, p. 
553) in which participants were told not to be surprised if the questions looked familiar to ones 
they had seen before. They were asked to answer as honestly as they could and to try not to 
duplicate their previous answers.  
Statistical Analyses 
All statistics were computed with SPSS (Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences) 
version 20.0, the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) and the psych package (Revelle, 2016) in R, or 
Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015) Version 7.4. The faking modeling approach by Ziegler et 
al. (2015) was used to calculate Latent Change Score Models for each FFM domain (Models 1 to 
5, see Table 4). As can be seen in the model, a latent change score variable is specified that 
captures the differences between the honest condition (measurement point 1) and the faking 
condition (measurement point 2). The mean of this latent variable can be considered the average 
deviation of faked scores from honest scores within each condition. Its variance reflects 
intraindividual differences in faking behavior. Model fit was tested with the Standardized Root 
Mean Residual (SRMR) < .11 as suggested by Hu and Bentler (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Additionally, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > .95 was used to determine the approximate fit of 
the model. In contrast to Hu and Bentler’s recommendations we do not report the RMSEA 
because it has been shown to yield incorrectly large values in models with few degrees of freedom 
(Greiff & Heene, 2017; Kenny, Kaniskan, & McCoach, 2015). Following Kenny et al. we do not 
report the RMSEA at all. Moreover, we also followed their advice to test the sensitivity of the 
model parameters by adding additional model specifications to test whether the key parameters 
change. This kind of modeling is also in line with recommendations by Heene, Hilbert, Draxler, 
Ziegler, and Bühner (2011) who suggested this procedure to deal with the fact that Hu and 
Bentler’s cutoffs are often not applicable to models, especially when loadings are small or only 
average.  
 Due to the complex method and the limited sample size, two dummy-coded group 
variables (faking bad vs. control group, faking good vs. control group) were integrated to specify 
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the faking condition. By regressing the latent change score variable representing faking onto these 
dummy variables, group differences could be tested which is an important step to gauge the 
model’s feasibility (Ziegler & Buehner, 2009). Accordingly, the faking good condition should 
score higher and the faking bad condition should score lower than the control condition on the 
latent faking variable in each of the five models. In order to test whether the faking instructions 
had distorted not only the means but also the correlations between the five domain scores 
analyzed here, we looked for correlation tables from data collected in real-life settings. For the 
fake good applicant condition we found a paper by Smith, Hanges, and Dickson (2001). Smith 
and colleagues reported results from an applicant sample (N = 2,500) with various occupations. It 
is important to note here that our sample contained only one occupation, participants aimed at. 
Thus, our correlations might be somewhat larger (Pauls & Crost, 2005). For the fake bad 
condition we were unable to find a study that had real life data, not data from a lab. Thus, the 
following analyses were only undertaken for the fake good condition. In a first step, we simply 
compared the correlations reported by Smith et al. with the confidence interval for the correlations 
found in our sample. In a second step, we specified a multigroup path model with the manifest 
five domain scores as correlated variables. Such a model has zero degrees of freedom and simply 
reflects the correlation matrix. We used the fake good condition as one group and the Smith et al. 
sample (reported correlation matrix) as the second group. We then fixed correlations to be equal 
across groups and tested whether model fit deteriorated. All code and output can be found in the 
OSF material. 
In a next step, factor scores for the latent change score variables reflecting faking from all 
five models were estimated to be used in the analyses for investigating whether faking would be 
found to be homogenous within and between the faking good and faking bad groups (Models 6 
and 7, see Figures 1 and 2). In a first step, a unidimensional model with the five faking scores as 
indicators of a latent faking variable was tested in each group. If the configuration of this model 
were found to be the same, a test of measurement invariance would be conducted in a second step. 
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This latter analysis was computed to help us determine whether the psychological processes of 
faking bad and faking good are conceptually similar.   
Finally, we computed regression analyses that were aimed at answering research questions 
regarding the possible constructs related to faking behavior. To this end, an EFA (principal axis 
factoring with oblimin rotation) with all six socially desirable responding scales was calculated in 
a first step to extract the often reported two factors of SDR1: Alpha (claiming unlikely virtues) and 
Gamma (denying common faults). In regression analyses, these two SDR factors, an overclaiming 
score, and the dark triad scores were included along with age and gender as covariates into the 
measurement models of faking good and faking bad derived in the prior analysis.  
 
The current study followed APA’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct as ethics board approval is not customary in the institute this research was conducted. 
 
Results 
Before describing the results of the current models, t-tests were conducted as a 
manipulation check. The faking groups differed significantly in the expected directions. Effect 
sizes were moderate to large. In order to put the effect sizes found into a perspective, it is 
informative to compare them with studies comparing applicants and incumbents. Several such 
studies exist (e.g., Ellingson et al., 2007; J. Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007). However, the meta-
analysis by Birkeland et al. (2006) showed that faking depends on the specific job demands. 
Consequently, mixing applicants for different jobs potentially blurs faking effects. Thus, we 
referred to a study by Jeong, Christiansen, Robie, Kung, and Kinney (2017) who compared 
applicants and incumbents for the same job. The effect sizes (Cohen’s d) reported across four 
samples ranged between .6 and 1.01. With two exceptions, our effects also fall within this range. 
Replication and Expansion 
                                                   
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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The first aim of this study was to replicate findings by Ziegler et al. (2015) for all five 
domains of the FFM: neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness. Table 4 includes the model fit statistics for all five Latent Change Score 
Models. It can be seen that all models fit the data satisfactorily. Moreover, all loadings of the 
manifest indicators were significant (p < .001). The regression weights for the dummy-coded 
group variables were all significant and in the expected directions (Table 5) which also serves as 
manipulation check.  
As stated above, we also compared the confidence intervals of correlations derived from 
our data with correlations reported by Smith et al. (2011). From the ten correlations, only four 
differed. Next, we also tested the correlation matrix of the five domain scores from the fake good 
condition for equivalence with a matrix taken from Smith et al. (2001). The model assuming 
equivalence had an acceptable fit: χ2(10) = 290.221, p < .01, CFI = .915, SRMR = .040. Model fit 
could even be improved by allowing the correlations between neuroticism and openness and 
extraversion and conscientiousness to vary (χ2[8] = 195.146, p < .01, CFI = .943, SRMR = .037).  
To sum up, for each structural model for the five personality factors, faking could be 
modeled, and the faking instructions were successful as evidenced by the relations with the 
dummy coded variables. Moreover, the resulting correlations between the five domains are not 
severely different from the correlational pattern found in real applicant data.   
Faking Good versus Faking Bad 
In a next step we tested measurement models for each faking condition. The assumed one-
factor solutions did not meet the criteria we set for model fit. Thus, based on the current data, 
faking good and faking bad cannot be considered homogeneous across the five domains. In both 
conditions, correlated residuals had to be specified based on modification indices and, 
importantly, interpretability (Heene, Hilbert, Draxler, Ziegler, & Bühner, 2011). The respecified 
models showed a more acceptable fit: faking bad, χ2(3) = 10.623, p < .01, CFI = .964, SRMR = 
.038, and faking good, χ2(5) = 12.163, p < .05, CFI = .957, SRMR = .056. The factor loadings are 
displayed in Figures 1 and 2. The normed χ2 values were for faking bad (normed χ2 = 3.54) and 
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faking good (normed χ2 = 2.43) both were acceptable. In the group that was instructed to fake bad, 
the factor loadings for neuroticism (a = -.85) and conscientiousness (a = .78) were very high. A 
high and significant correlation between the residuals of the factor scores for agreeableness and 
openness (r = .55) was specified. The opposite applied to the factor loadings in the group that was 
instructed to fake good. The highest loadings here occurred for the factors manipulated in the 
instructions, that is, openness to experience (a = .67) and agreeableness (a = .56), but the loadings 
for neuroticism (a = -.56) and conscientious (a = .46) were also substantial. The residual of 
extraversion had to be fixed to zero. Furthermore, we found a strong and significant correlation 
between the residuals of the factor scores for conscientiousness and neuroticism (r = -.52). We did 
not test for measurement invariance because the models did clearly not have the same 
configuration, that is, they exhibited different but potentially meaningful correlated residuals.           
The Nature of Faking  
To investigate correlates of faking behavior, we tested selected social desirability scale 
scores, an overclaiming score, and the scores from the Short Dark Triad Scale as predictors of 
faking bad and faking good in two regression models.  
First an EFA was applied to all of the SDR scores to extract two factors. Table 6 presents 
the factor loadings. The first factor was marked by the MMPI Lie scale, the impression 
management scale and the Marlowe-Crowne scale. This factor was called Gamma following J. S. 
Wiggins (1964). The second factor comprised the Edwards scale and the self-deceptive 
enhancement scale of the BIDR and was named Alpha (J. S. Wiggins, 1964). The factor 
intercorrelation between Gamma and Alpha was moderate (r = .37).  
In a next step, separate regressions for the faking bad and faking good (Table 7) 
conditions were conducted. The predictors age and gender (male=1; female=2) were included as 
covariates. Other predictors were factor scores for Gamma and Alpha, scores for overclaiming, 
narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism. The explained variance for faking bad was 
68.7%. A significant contribution was made by the factors gender (β = -.20; r = -.23) and Alpha 
(β = -.32; r = -.46). In the model for the faking good group the explained variance was 67.4 %. 
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Four predictors Machiavellianism (β = .25; r = .21), narcissism (β = -.37; r = -.38), Alpha (β = -
.26; r = -.38) and overclaiming (β = -.16; r = -.15) were significant. 
Discussion 
The main goals of this study were (a) to apply Ziegler et al.’s (2015) statistical approach 
to modeling faking to scores from all five factor domains, (b) to test whether the psychological 
process of faking is homogeneous across those domains and across faking good and faking bad 
behavior, and finally, (c) to investigate predictors of faking. At two measurement occasions, 
participants filled out a personality inventory, first under normal conditions (honestly) and, in the 
second part of the study, with specific faking instructions (to fake bad or fake good). Furthermore, 
in the first part, we administered a test battery including a variety of measures capturing social 
desirability, overclaiming, and the dark triad. Some of these measures are typical tests in a clinical 
setting, for example the lie scale of the MMPI-2. Our findings indicated that all domains of the 
FFM were faked and that variance in faking behavior could be modeled with Ziegler et al.’s 
approach. The findings also implied that faking behavior differed across the five domains and in 
accordance with situational demands (faking good or bad). This means that faking is not a 
singular process. These results could help to explain contrasting findings from clinical and I/O 
research with regard to the evaluation of so-called social desirability scales. Finally, whereas the 
selected constructs explained substantial amounts of variance in both faking conditions, only the 
Alpha factor (i.e. the common variance underlying the Edwards scale and the self-deceptive 
enhancement scale) was associated with faking in both conditions.  
Replication and Expansion 
The current findings provide empirical support for the usefulness of Ziegler et al.’s (2015) 
approach to model faking. Moreover, the inclusion of all five domains into the analyses is an 
important expansion. We further showed that the modeling approach also works for faking bad 
instructions. When faking good, participants were able to present themselves in a more open, 
agreeable, extraverted, and conscientious way, and the opposite held for faking bad. The existence 
of such a modeling approach can be beneficial for further explorations of the nature of faking in 
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different settings. At the same time, one important but rather practical drawback is that two 
measurement occasions are needed for this type of investigation. Whereas this is not problematic 
in laboratory settings, it poses a substantial obstacle in real-life settings. However, there are 
empirical studies that have been able to circumvent this problem (e.g. Griffith, Chmielowski, & 
Yoshita, 2007).  
Faking Good versus Faking Bad  
Furthermore, we investigated the psychological processes behind faking good and faking 
bad. The current findings imply that there are different processes behind these two behaviors. This 
conclusion is based on the differing loading patterns but also on the different correlated residuals 
in each condition. Whereas correlated residuals have to be dealt with carefully, especially 
considering the sample size used here, the specific patterns we found can still be meaningful, even 
though they require replication in independent samples. Regardless of this, the fact that a model 
without correlated residuals did not fit clearly implies that faking cannot be regarded as a 
homogeneous process, neither under fake bad nor under fake good conditions.  
In both conditions, we found strong loadings on some faking scores and correlated 
residuals among other faking scores. It is interesting that this pattern was reversed in the two 
groups: High loadings for faking scores of neuroticism and conscientiousness in the group that 
was instructed to fake bad imply a generally bad self-presentation without an emphasis on the 
domains manipulated by the instructions. These influences characterize the variance that is 
common across all faking bad scores. However, a correlated residual between agreeableness and 
openness, two of the manipulated domains, indicated that the participants recognized the 
situation-specific demands, resulting in faking behavior that was not common to all domains but 
specific to the ones that were manipulated.  
A different picture emerged for the psychological process represented by the measurement 
model for faking good. Here, the loadings of the manipulated domains extraversion, openness, 
and agreeableness were dominant. This implies that not only was faking good triggered by the 
instructions, but it was also reflected in all five of the domains, even the ones that were not 
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manipulated. However, in this condition, there was also a correlation between the residuals for 
neuroticism and conscientiousness, neither of which was manipulated. Again, this could mean that 
these domains were systematically faked in a slightly different, perhaps more general way. 
Finally, it has to be noted that the residual for extraversion had to be fixed to zero in the faking 
good condition. In other words, this factor score completely marked the general faking good 
factor. 
We can also conclude that it is always easier to fake neuroticism and conscientiousness, 
regardless of whether one is faking good or bad. However, it might be easier to be successful at 
faking good than at faking bad. The model of faking behavior by Ziegler (2011) stated that faking 
occurred only when test takers perceived that the item was important to reach one’s situation 
specific goal. This could be easier in a faking good scenario and could explain the strong 
contributions by the domains that were manipulated. In a faking bad situation, it might still be 
obvious that the item is relevant, but the best way to portray oneself in a negative way might be 
less clear. Neuroticism and conscientiousness are most likely easier to distort in a negative 
direction due to their clear implications for clinical as well as I/O related situations. In conclusion 
it is important to note that models for faking bad and faking good were dissimilar and thus 
implying different psychological processes. Importantly, the inclusion of correlated residuals 
within each condition showed that faking cannot even be considered to be homogeneous across all 
domains, even when looking at the conditions separately. In other words, when faking it not only 
matters whether one aims to appear better or worse. It also seems to matter which construct an 
item reflects. As Ziegler (2011) noted, people first judge each item with regard to its relevance for 
the faking aim. Only if an item is considered to be informative, faking occurs. The current results 
further suggest that the ensuing faking process is additionally influenced by the construct the item 
reflects. Thus, even if one aims at faking good, it matters whether the item concerns extraversion 
or conscientiousness, for example. One reason might be that each domain is involved in the 
process. In other words, people already high in extraversion have less room for distortion. An 
alternative to this statistical explanation would be that fakers have different implicit or explicit 
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knowledge of the relevance of each domain for the pursued goal. For example, if one person holds 
a different picture of a job than another person, differences in faking will occur for each domain. 
Analyzing only one domain at a time, this heterogeneity will not be detected (see Ziegler & 
Hagemann, 2015, Cases I and III). However, once several domains are analyzed at the same time, 
the idea of unidimensionality has to be rejected. Thus, the idea of a common faking process across 
all domains is problematic even within conditions.  
The Nature of Faking 
The last objective of this investigation was to predict faking behavior with a variety of 
scores from other scales. This was also done in order to directly compare the ability of so-called 
social desirability scales to detect faking in faking bad and faking good situations. To this end we 
kept the situation constant and manipulated participants’ motivation to fake. The empirical 
support for the assumptions made above was mixed. Looking at specific predictors, gender was 
significant only for faking bad such that women faked less than men. With regard to the so-called 
faking-detection scales, only the Alpha factor had a significant regression weight for faking bad 
and faking good. According to Paulhus (2002) Alpha is associated with “[…] a self-deceptive 
tendency to exaggerate one’s social and intellectual status.” (Paulhus, 2002, p. 63). In our 
analyses the Alpha factor was marked by the Edwards scale and the self-deceptive enhancement 
scale. Thus, from a theoretical perspective higher scores on Alpha reflect a tendency to exaggerate 
the positive self-perceptions (positive loadings of Edwards scale and self-deceptive enhancement 
scale. This means that the common variance underlying the two scales is important. Pauls and 
Stemmler (2003) could show that self-deceptive enhancement scales reflect an egoistic bias (also 
see Paulhus, 2002). It is important to consider the direction of the relation, though. The regression 
weights for the Alpha factor were negative in both cases. For Faking bad this means that the 
deviation between the honest score and the faked score becomes more negative the higher the 
person’s score on Alpha. In other words, a stronger egoistic bias led to more faking bad. For 
faking good the regression weight was also negative which means that a stronger egoistic bias led 
to less faking. This is an interesting finding which highlights the potential differences underlying 
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the two psychological processes taking place. Whereas an egoistic bias might not lead to self-
restraint when trying to look bad, it might be problematic when trying to look very good. The 
most obvious explanation could be that the bias already led to inflated honest scores. Thus, there 
was less room to fake good but enough room to fake bad. This would also mean that the SDR 
scales do not really pick up faking but only detect changes from the self-enhanced “honest” 
ratings. Importantly, our analyses (Appendix B) also showed that only the Edwards social 
desirability scale and the Marlowe-Crowne “attribution of desirable behavior” scale had 
significant and also negative regression weights in predicting faking.  
Despite significant zero-order correlations, none of the dark triad traits significantly 
predicted faking bad. Thus, it might be the common core of the dark triad that explains differences 
in faking bad. Book, Visser, and Volk (2015) described this common core as a combination of 
callousness and low honesty/humility. It seems reasonable that distorting one’s answers, which 
not only increases one’s own chances but also potentially comes at the costs of others, is related to 
callousness and dishonesty. However, Machiavellianism was only significantly correlated with 
faking good. This lack of influence on faking bad might have occurred for two reasons. First, per 
definition, a person with high scores on Machiavellianism does not depreciate himself or herself. 
Second, asking test takers to fake on their questionnaires might have created a strong situation 
with a strong and unambiguous benefit for everyone. For such a situation, trait activation theory 
(R. P. Tett & Burnett, 2003; Ziegler et al., 2014) would predict that trait differences relevant in 
other situations will not manifest. It is interesting that for faking good behavior, the findings were 
slightly different regarding narcissism and Machiavellianism, supporting the conclusion that 
faking bad and faking good represent related but distinct psychological processes. Especially the 
correlation between Machiavellianism and faking good is theoretically interesting. For 
Machiavellianism the regression weight was positive which means that a manipulative personality 
led to more faking. This result fits with the definition of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 
2013).For Machiavellians a lie is a good instrument to influencing people to get what they want. 
Also Kashy and DePaulo (1996) reported that manipulative people used more lies. Clearly, 
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manipulative behavior as observed here is prototypical for Machiavellians. Thus, the current 
finding underscores the potentially dark nature of faking behavior. 
The negative regression weight for narcissism was most likely an artifact due to a ceiling 
effect. Narcissists tend to self-promote even under honest conditions (Maaß & Ziegler, 2017). 
Thus, there might have been too little rating scale left to further self-promote. Finally, the result 
for overclaiming was a surprise. Above we had hypothesized that overclaiming should be 
positively correlated with faking good. The current results show that despite being a small effect, 
the direction is opposite to the one assumed: People scoring higher on overclaiming faked less in 
the fake good condition. According to Paulhus, Bruce, and Trapnell (1995), outliers can affect 
correlations in faking studies. Those authors could show that such outliers often did not read or 
follow faking instructions. Ludeke and Makransky (2016) could show that such careless 
responding was related to overclaiming. These ideas informed an additional post hoc analyses (see 
OSF). The data set included three participants with an overclaiming score of 1 within the fake 
good condition. Such a score can only be achieved when claiming familiarity with all items. This 
could imply careless responding even though we lack the definite proof at this point. Moreover, 
those three participants also achieved low faking good scores. Thus, they faked much less than the 
other participants, which also implies not following instructions. Be that as it may, excluding 
those three participants yielded a non-significant correlation between faking good and 
overclaiming (r = -.07, p = .46). To sum up, the current analyses seem to suggest that 
overclaiming might be more responsive to careless responding than substantial differences in 
faking good or bad.  
What remains is the question why clinical and I/O psychologists might have come up with 
such differing results. One answer that seems conclusive is the focus of I/O psychologists on non-
clinical scales.  
 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
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On the basis of the successful application of Ziegler et al.’s (2015) faking model, we 
recommend that this model be applied to further investigate the nature of faking good and faking 
bad. We tried to simulate two different high stakes situations in the current investigation. The lab 
setting is certainly a limiting factor with regard to the generalizability of the findings. Based on 
the faking intention models described above, it is also very likely that the variance in faking 
behavior is considerably larger in real-life settings. This, in turn, would potentially increase the 
regression weights found here.  
A new aspect worth following up in future research are the results implying that faking is 
not homogenous across traits within a certain condition, and neither across conditions. This also 
means that results from studies with only one kind of condition should not be generalized to all 
faking situations. Further studies should continue to focus on both kinds of instructions to better 
understand the psychological process of faking.  
Furthermore, on the basis of the current empirical findings, we cannot recommend that 
response distortion scales such as social desirability scales or overclaiming questionnaires be used 
to measure faking regardless of their theoretical underpinnings or the specific situational demand. 
The current study suggests that the common variance underlying Alpha scales like the Edwards 
scale and the self-deceptive enhancement scale is related to faking good and faking bad. In fact, 
for faking bad, this Alpha factor was the only significant predictor in the regression analysis 
besides gender. Considering earlier findings (Bensch et al., 2017) that showed that those scores 
are not free of personality variance, and, further considering that within each measurement model 
we only controlled for the variance of the modeled domain but not the other four domains, it 
cannot be ruled out that the relation between Alpha and faking found here was due to personality 
variance captured within Alpha. In order to rule this out, a considerably larger sample is needed, 
which would allow to model all five domains in one model, thereby controlling for each domain 
when extracting individual differences in faking behavior.  
Limitations and Outlook 
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In the current study, we examined only one context (job applicant). It is necessary to 
replicate these findings in clinical contexts (Grieve & De Groot, 2011; Paulhus, 2002) before 
generalizing to this area of psychological assessment. One further reason for a replication is 
the small degree of freedom of the specified models. The measurement models for faking bad 
and faking good had to be changed based on modification indices. While this informs the 
question whether faking is homogeneous across domains within each condition, the 
generalizability of the added correlated residuals must be shown in a replication.  
Another limitation is that we did not systematically vary real-life influences (e.g., job 
market, desirability of the job, etc.) here. This might have led to variance restrictions. Finally, we 
used a lab setting in which participants imagined specific roles and demands. This clearly limits 
generalizability. Still, we hope that the current results help to further our understanding of faking.  
Detailed insights into the construct of faking are important for a number of reasons. 
Hence, it seems necessary to apply qualitative approaches to generate hypotheses regarding 
further differences in faking behavior. This will be vital for understanding the person-situation 
interaction resulting in faking. To come back full circle to our starting point, the definition of 
faking (Ziegler et al., 2012b) includes two important aspects: situational demands and person 
characteristics. The heterogeneity of the construct of faking emphasizes the person-situation 
interaction. Depending on what is triggered in a situation (faking good or faking bad), people 
seem to behave differently. The current study provides further insights into the person 
characteristics of this interaction. The specific situational demands, narcissism, Machiavellianism, 
and the variance behind the Alpha factor (exaggerate one’s social status) play important roles in 
faking. However, the current results also show that faking is not always the same thing. The 
situation as well as the trait focused matter, even for dishonest behavior.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for All Measures 
Scale Min Max M SD ΩW 
Edwards SD scale 1.96 4.92 3.50 .55 0.88 
1st factor Marlowe-Crowne scale 1.9 4.8 3.57 .47 0.70 
2nd factor Marlowe-Crowne scale 1.85 4.61 3.01 .50 0.74 
Self-deceptive enhancement 2.55 5.85 4.07 .58 0.73 
Impression management 1.35 6.15 3.87 .78 0.79 
Lie scale 1.33 4.2 2.51 .50 0.75 
Overclaiming 0 1 .56 .19 0.64* 
Neuroticism T1 4.66 26.66  15.58 4.09 0.91 
Extraversion T1 5.17 27.16 18.00 3.66 0.85 
Openness T1 10.66 28.66 20.98 2.86 0.70 
Agreeableness T1 8.33 27 19.40 2.91 0.77 
Conscientiousness T1 8.83 28.83 19.08 3.46 0.86 
Narcissism 1.33 4.33 2.81 .54 0.69 
Machiavellianism 1.3 4.4 2.63 .60 0.81 
Psychopathy 1 3.55 1.95 .53 0.76 
Note. N = 233. ΩW = McDonald’s Omega. *= Explained variance from a principal component analysis as a 
lower-bound reliability estimate (Cureton & D'Agostino, 1983). Min, Max = Minimum and maximum value by 
any person on the respective scale, M = Mean, SD = standard deviation. Openness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism were measured with the NEO-PI-R. T1 = Time 1.  
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Table 3 
Mean Differences between Faking Good and Faking Bad 
d t df 
Neuroticism 
Fake good 1.63 17.57*** 115 
Fake bad -.48 -5.17*** 116 
Extraversion 
Fake good -1.46 -15.69*** 115 
Fake bad .88 9.51*** 116 
Openness 
Fake good -1.11 -12.00*** 115 
Fake bad .59 17.24*** 116 
Agreeableness 
Fake good -.57 -6.18*** 115 
Fake bad 1.03 11.20*** 116 
Conscientiousness 
Fake good -1.66 -17.86*** 115 
Fake bad .61 6.62*** 116 
Note. Nfaking bad = 117. Nfaking good = 116. d = Cohen’s d. 
***p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Model Fits for Models 1 to 5 
Model χ2 df p CFI SRMR 
1 Faking neuroticism 299.52 52 < .001 .94 .06 
2 Faking extraversion 348.77 54 < .001 .90 .08 
3 Faking openness  319.68 52 < .001 .90 .07 
4 Faking agreeableness 293.33 52 < .001 .91 .07 
5 Faking conscientiousness 258.27 52 < .001 .95 .07 
Note. N = 233. CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. 
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Table 5 
Regression Weights for the Dummy-Variables Predicting Faking for each Domain 
β 
Faking neuroticism 
Faking bad .23** 
Faking good -.54** 
Faking extraversion 
Faking bad -.59** 
Faking good .31** 
Faking openness 
Faking bad -.69** 
Faking good .21** 
Faking agreeableness 
Faking bad -.64** 
Faking good .19** 
Faking conscientiousness 
Faking bad -.39** 
Faking good .48** 
Note. Nfaking bad = 117. Nfaking good = 116. The manipulated personality factors are in bold. 
**p < .01.  
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Table 6 
Factor Loadings After Oblimin Rotation 
Gamma Alpha 
Lie scale .79 .03 
Impression management .76 -.13 
First-factor Marlowe-Crowne scale (attribution of desirable behavior) .54 .36 
Second-factor Marlowe-Crowne scale (denial of undesirable behavior) .34 .04 
Edwards SD scale -.02 1.00 
Self-deceptive enhancement .20 .43 
Note. N = 233. 
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Table 7 
Regression Weights for Correlates of Faking 
Condition 
Predictor 
Faking bad 
     β r 
Faking good 
     β r 
Age -.07 -.16 -.10 -.13
Sex -.20* -.23** -.03 -.02
Alpha 
-.32* 
-
.46*** -.37*** -.38*** 
Gamma -.15 -.28** .05 -.07
Overclaiming .09 < .01 -.16* -.15
Narcissism -.23 -.21 -.37** -.38***
Machiavellianism .05 .21 .25* .21*
Psychopathy .01 .18 < .01 -.01
Note. Nfaking bad = 117. Nfaking good = 116. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Figure 1. Model 6: Faking bad. N = 117. Neuro = Neuroticism; Extra = Extraversion; Open = Openness; Agree 
= Agreeableness; Consc = Conscientiousness. *** p < .001.  
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Figure 2. Model 7: Faking good. N = 116. Neuro = Neuroticism; Extra = Extraversion; Open = Openness; Agree 
= Agreeableness; Consc = Conscientiousness. *** p < .001. 
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